As Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip rolled ahead, the Palestinians were getting ready to hold huge celebrations. What they register is that without their having to pay any price, the Israeli army is evacuating the settlements and its own bases, removing all the roadblocks and giving up its barrier separating Egypt from Palestinian territory. The terror groups are not being disarmed, there is no guarantee that the Strip will be demilitarized in the future, and there is no assurance that the current tahdeah or "calming down" that Hamas has agreed to maintain will become an official binding armistice.

What is more, though Israel is abandoning the Strip, it will still be considered an "occupying power" by the Palestinians, a kind of absentee landlord, responsible for what happens on his property although he isn't there. Thus, the Palestinians can demand that Sharon allow them to exercise sovereignty at the same time as they urge him to keep shouldering the burden of an occupier's obligations. A bizarre situation will arise, with Gaza no longer under occupation, but also not free, and certainly not independent. It's a non-state, finally liberated but still perceived as conquered.

Broad agreement is shaping up among the Palestinians that their achievements are the result of only one thing: persistence in the armed struggle. They see Israel as leaving the Strip because of the Qassam rockets, the mortar bombs, and, above all, the suicide bombers, a terror campaign that combined with demographic considerations to make Israel's continued presence there too costly in Sharon's estimation. The disengagement is the product of the Palestinian rifle, and not the political shift of Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), they believe. Indeed, they opine, the idea of the unilateral withdrawal was born while Arafat was still alive, and the moderate Abu Mazen has failed in his attempt to stop it and had to accept the fait accompli. Thus, credit does not belong to the leader who speaks against terror but to those who masterminded it.

Indeed, the disengagement in Gaza is the fulfillment of Arafat's dream of "runaway statehood" come true. As often pointed out in this column, he wanted a state not bound by agreements, a state won by blood and not ink. It is therefore no wonder that there are already many Palestinian voices - from among not only the Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but also the Fatah - calling for endeavors to achieve a similar result in the West Bank. Islamic Jihad leader, Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, for example, says in public that the chief task now is to get Qassams into the West Bank and to resume suicide bombings at the right moment.

Gaza is a Palestinian precedent: proof that it is possible to dislodge Israel from territory without giving anything in return, not even a cease-fire. Even the head of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, now admits that the Oslo Accords, which he opposed, allowed entry of Palestinian forces into the country and the burial of Oslo during the armed intifada is giving them their first territorial base; from this base, the campaign must be conducted from now on, with Gaza serving as a protected rear for the West Bank front.

In the internal Palestinian debate between those who want Gaza to be the nucleus of a decent state and those who want it to be no more than a secure springboard for warring militias, it is the latter who are winning, so far. In the near future, we are likely to witness not only the arming of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatuses with equipment that was barred by the Oslo Accords - through Egypt and later via the seaport - but also the upgrading of the terrorist militias' rockets, as well as the entry of Palestinian fighters, mainly from Lebanon. Discussions over transfer into Gaza of up to 3,000 Palestinian militiamen from Lebanon have already been held in Beirut by Abu Mazen's emissary, Abbas Zaki.

All this does not mean that fire will be opened from Gaza on the day after the disengagement. The Palestinians need be in no hurry. On the contrary, they have to prepare the next round carefully, and to wait for the right circumstances. They are aware of the difficulties they face in launching a new wave of terror from the West Bank, as long as the Israeli army can operate freely there. Meanwhile, Hamas declares explicitly that it isn't interested in getting rid of Abu Mazen's regime, but only in "partnership" within it. Stopping the construction of Israel's security barrier, particularly the Jerusalem section, is their next objective, and to do that they need the goodwill of the international community.

Accordingly, the Palestinians will probably go ahead with their planned elections early next year. Hamas will become a "popular army" with a powerful parliamentary representation. In fact, it is already preventing the PA from doing what it wants to do in Gush Katif, and compelling it to coordinate moves in advance with them. The danger of a split in Fatah will get more and more serious, even if it doesn't actually happen in the end.

The Palestinian non-state will draw generous international aid, even as it cuddles its weapons, wallows in armed anarchy, and opposes careful scrutiny of the people and the goods entering and departing its borders. It will call for negotiations on the basis of agreements that have been violated and will propose peace without agreeing to a cease-fire.

Israel certainly had to give up its presence in the Gaza Strip, but was the way that was chosen the only possible way? Perhaps, just like in the long-ago days of Oslo, the direction was right, but the order in which things were done was utterly wrong.

The Jerusalem Report, September 5, 2005 issue