If the police turn Arab citizens from victims into perpetrators in their investigation
of the mob that killed the Israeli soldier who opened fire on a bus in Shfaram,
says Dr. Adel Manna, passions could be ignited


The killing of four Israeli Arabs in a shooting spree by a Jewish extremist in early August turned a spotlight on the sensitive issue of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. On August 4, Eden Natan-Zada, an IDF deserter and supporter of the banned, racist Kach movement, opened fire inside a bus in Shfaram, between Haifa and Nazareth. Police boarded the bus and overpowered the killer, but members of an angry mob that had surrounded the vehicle forced their way in and beat Natan-Zada to death.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon described the shooting as a "heinous act by a blood-thirsty terrorist." The IDF refused to give the soldier a military burial, and he was interred in a civilian cemetery in Rishon Letzion, where his parents live, but only after Sharon ordered the reluctant mayor to authorize the burial. The killings drew comparisons with earlier traumatic events, particularly the murder by Kach supporter Baruch Goldstein of 29 Muslim worshipers in Hebron in 1994, and clashes in October 2000, shortly after the eruption of the Palestinian intifada, in which Israeli police shot and killed 12 Arab Israeli citizens.

Dr. Adel Manna, director of the Center for Israeli-Arab Studies at the Jerusalem-based Van Leer Institute, does not think the Shfaram killings will have anything like the same impact as the two earlier crises. Interviewed in his office, Manna told The Report that where Goldstein succeeded in slowing the Oslo peace process, Natan-Zada's action will have no effect whatsoever on the Jewish terrorist's goal: derailing the government's planned withdrawal from Gaza. As for the October 2000 clashes, Manna says they incensed the Arab community because Israeli police used force in a way they would never have done against Jews. It was, he says, a clear case of the Israeli establishment's double standard in dealing with Israeli Arabs, whereas Natan-Zada's action was the work of a deluded individual.

The Jerusalem Report: How will the attack affect relations between Arabs and Jews?
Dr. Adel Manna: For one, it led the Israeli media and establishment to see Arab Israelis in a different light. Suddenly, the Arabs were victims. They weren't in the news for riots or crime, but because they were targeted. There was even some empathy here and there. We had never heard this kind of talk in Israel before.

Does this indicate a profound change?

No, it was just a fleeting moment of compassion. An aberration. In a couple of weeks everyone will have forgotten this terror attack and the Arabs will be reconsigned to their regular place in the Jewish consciousness as a demographic time bomb, a fifth column, as Palestinians who identify with Israel's enemies.

Why didn't the killings lead to riots or attempts to wreak vengeance?

I don't think the reason for the restraint was the empathy shown by Israeli leaders. It had more to do with the Arab community. They understood that this was the act of a madman, not a regular soldier acting on behalf of the establishment. Secondly, the dimensions of the massacre were relatively small. The terrorist killed four people, not 30. And he was killed on the spot. That satisfied feelings of vengeance that people who witnessed the massacre might have had. But basically, it's a question of the character of the Israeli Arab community. In the main, contrary to Jewish stereotypes, they are not a volatile people.

If there is an investigation into the lynching, and people are tried and convicted, could that lead to an inflammable situation?

If what we see is the police and the courts, as is usually the case, taking much tougher attitudes toward Arab citizens, there could be trouble. If the police turn the Arabs from victims to perpetrators, and the media goes to town on this, that could ignite passions. I think the establishment needs to show real sensitivity.

Because of the trauma of the events of October 2000, perhaps both sides are being more careful now?

I think that applies to only a small number of people in leadership positions on both sides. For the majority, those traumatic events only strengthened fears, deepened distrust, and reinforced mutual stereotypes. For the Arabs it strengthened their sense of victimization by the authorities.

Are Israeli Arabs moving further from Jewish Israel, and identifying more with the Palestinians in the territories?

It's not so clear-cut. When they turn away from their Israeliness, that does not mean automatic identification with the Palestinians. Acts like the October clashes and Shfaram massacre lead to greater alienation. They remind the Israeli Arabs that they are not part of the mainstream, that they are outsiders. But don't forget Israeli Arabs have also been killed in the intifada. For years, I never sent my daughter to school by bus. We suffer from the intifada even though we aren't part of the consensus that keeps the occupation going.

What's the outlook for normalizing relations?

Israeli Arabs believe that in order to fight for their civil rights, the flames of the conflict have to be lowered. Only then will the Jewish majority start dealing with domestic issues. They will be calmer, less afraid, have fewer anti-Arab stereotypes. But even if there is peace, it won't be enough. Israel will have to ask itself the cardinal question: How can it be Jewish and democratic? How can you give Arabs equal rights in a country that will want to be even more Jewish after peace is achieved?

The Jerusalem Report, September 5, 2005 issue