It should not be denied: Although the intifada is ending with a sense of failure and disappointment among the Palestinians, they seem to have probably made some important strategic gains. These are the main ones:

? Israel has in effect reconciled itself to the militarization of the Palestinian territories, as brought about by Yasser Arafat. The armed movements, chiefly Hamas, are keeping their weapons and are continuing to develop more effective ones. The terrorists on the wanted list, some 500 in number, are getting immunity from Israeli retribution, and in fact their past crimes are to be ignored. How far this reality is from the promises of the PLO before Oslo that a Palestinian state would be so demilitarized that its "police force would be prepared to go barefoot," as Arafat once declared. What was at first described as "a police force" has evolved into a hybrid of a gendarmerie and terrorist gangs. The militarization is also reflected in the political culture, where even today the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are considered the jewel in the crown of al-Fatah, which perhaps may yet be called upon to perform their terrorist "mission." Sure, Israel will keep demanding to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, but that is not within reach for the time being.

? Israel has also reconciled with the loss of its direct control over the borders of the future Palestinian state, what in the days of Yitzhak Rabin was known as "the outer envelope." Sooner or later, Israel will withdraw its forces from the Philadelphi Axis (the narrow strip of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip), and it is not at all clear that Israel will have a presence at the border crossing point there. (Whatever Israel agrees to in the end will serve as a model when the time comes for the arrangements on the border between Palestine and Jordan.) What this means is that only limitations set by the Egyptians will prevent the Palestinians arming themselves to their hearts' content. Even more so when the airport near Rafah is reopened and construction of the port at Gaza is completed.

? Israel is giving up land and dismantling settlements, without getting anything in return, without any agreement. In a way, Sharon has adopted Arafat's plan, described many times in this column, to achieve "runaway statehood" - which is to say, sovereignty without having to pay for it in the coin of peace or by making far-reaching commitments, and certainly not by declaring an end to the conflict and eschewing all further claims, as demanded by president Clinton and prime minister Barak at Camp David.

These are not trivial changes. They show how far Israel has deviated in recent years from axiomatic principles, to the extent that from now on we will be facing a completely different reality not only from that which the creators of the Oslo Accords intended, but even from the forecasts made by their opponents.

And as the strategic outlook has changed so much, one may carefully begin approaching the question of the order of priorities of strategic goals. Is the main objective still a peace treaty with the Palestinians, which would be followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state, or has the time come perhaps to consider letting the Palestinians have a state under a tight armistice based on less than full peace, something of an updated version of the 1949 accords with the neighboring Arab states, as has been recommended more than once in this column?

The reasoning is plain: There is no chance on the horizon of a permanent settlement that would include agreed-upon solutions for such intractable issues as the refugees, Jerusalem or borders. It is therefore impossible to tie the establishment of a Palestinian state to the permanent settlement without risking its indefinite postponement, with a consequential collapse of Palestinian society into Israel's unwilling arms. The establishment of the state in "provisional borders," as called for in Stage B of the internationally backed road map, requires that it be dependent not on a permanent settlement, but rather on a more limited settlement that would ensure peaceful conduct along the borders but would put off the sensitive issues to a later stage.

From Israel's point of view, it would be better to work rapidly toward the establishment of a Palestinian state fettered only by interim arrangements than to insist on a permanent arrangement and consequently face a remilitarized anarchic Palestinian entity, open to the Arab world and free of obligatory commitments, apart from the scattered remnants left over from the Oslo Accords. Adequate support and supervision by Jordan, Egypt and other countries will reduce the risk of this state, compared to the grave threat of collapse posed by the alternative.

The Jerusalem Report, April 4, 2005 issue