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David Horovitz: Netanyahu's Moment

In the recent history of Israel, one period stands out as relatively terror-free: the three years from late spring 1996, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Israel�s prime minister. There were a handful of bitter suicide bombings in those years, but nothing to compare with the orgy of Hamas killings in February and March of 1996 that destroyed Shimon Peres�s prospects of maintaining the prime ministership, and the policies, he had inherited following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. And nothing, of course, to compare with the sustained and strategic terrorist assault that ensued after the collapse of Ehud Barak�s Camp David peace bid in summer 2000.

Success has many fathers, and several have tried to claim credit for that prolonged lull, including that self-destructed politician Yitzhak Mordechai, Netanyahu�s defense minister, and Peres himself, who insists that Bibi reaped the belated benefit of his importunations to Yasser Arafat to confront the terrorists. There are also those who argue that the calm stemmed from a strategic decision by Hamas, which saw no need to bomb Israel and alienate potential supporters of Palestinian statehood, when Netanyahu�s disinclination to move forward with the Oslo process was provoking mounting international frustration with Israel and mounting international support for an independent Palestine.

But Netanyahu himself has no doubt about why terror was in abeyance under his watch. It was, he has always maintained, a simple and direct consequence of his demand for "reciprocity," his explicit message to Arafat that, while he would be prepared to move ahead with negotiations if the bombers were reined in, there would no progress until such time. Indeed, Netanyahu sees the seeds of his own prime ministerial downfall as having been planted at late 1998�s Wye Plantation summit with Arafat, President Clinton and Jordan�s dying King Hussein, when he ill-advisedly allowed himself to be persuaded to relinquish territory to the Palestinian Authority in the northern West Bank, and his coalition speedily unraveled.

Before, during and after his term as prime minister, Netanyahu has often seemed a politician in the worst sense of the word -- a man preoccupied with his own self-interest, and prepared to foment dissent among various sectors of the Israeli populace in order to advance it. But buoyed by that 1996-99 track record, Netanyahu considers himself an expert on terrorism, and it is the area in which one would most have expected him to take a principled stand.

And yet, many months after his Likud prime ministerial successor Ariel Sharon unveiled his disengagement vision, Netanyahu has still to stake out a clear position on it. This most verbally adept of Israeli politicians has swung almost inaudibly back and forth, alternatively signaling grudging tentative consent and brooding opposition.

In an Israel that is dangerously drifting, with Sharon struggling to retain power and move ahead on disengagement, and facing a Palestinian leadership that plainly regards time as being on its side, the vacillating Netanyahu is now the key figure. With a single speech, he could drag the rudderless Likud party firmly into Sharon�s disengagement corner, or champion a revolt. That he has failed thus far to do either is a testament to his political uncertainty and to an absence of principle -- he has, quite simply, been unable to determine to his own satisfaction which course is more likely to pave the way for his prime ministerial return.

The decision on whether or not to unilaterally disengage from Gaza and the northern West Bank is momentous. It will shape not only the parameters of our relationship with the Palestinians, but also our internal dynamic. Netanyahu is uniquely positioned to influence both its outcome and the consequent domestic climate. He owes it to the people he so desperately wants to lead again to put aside, for a moment, the calculations over which route will better suit him personally in the short term. Notwithstanding his recent call for a nationwide referendum, he needs to make his own stance plain. He needs to consult with the advisers whom he argues enabled him to effectively reduce terrorism in his prime ministerial years, and emerge with a principled assessment on whether the pullout Sharon advocates will ultimately cost lives or save them, strengthen the bombers or weaken them, render Israel more vulnerable or better able to defend itself. He must then explain his position and stick to it -- whatever political course it requires him to follow.

It would be the defining moment of Netanyahu�s political career. But it would be much more than that, too. It would determine the fate of the disengagement initiative and the nature of Israel for many years to come.

This is my last column as editor of the Jerusalem Report. I am moving on after 14 years with the magazine, the last six as editor. It has been an immense privilege to work here all these years, with an extraordinarily talented and committed group of journalists. If daily journalism is a first draft of history, I like to think of The Report, with its biweekly format affording more rigorous reporting and editing, as a kind of second draft. It is a unique publication -- bringing fine, independent journalism to a sophisticated and dedicated readership. I thank you, our readers, for enabling us to thrive. And I know The Report will continue to progress under the astute stewardship of my long-time deputy and friend, Sharon Ashley, who takes over as editor-in-chief.