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Peace: Toward Self-Rule - Bombers for Peace
Ehud Ya'ari
The PLO, at its headquarters in Tunis, is on the verge of a major internal revolution as Yasser Arafat gains support for the peace process from some unexpected quarters
The thing that struck me most after a few days in Tunis was the strength of support for the agreement with Israel in the very PLO circles that for the last 28 years were at the vanguard of the armed struggle against Israel, spearheading the Intifada and ordering terror operations abroad.
It is only through face-to-face talks with these characters, whom I have come to recognize from a distance over the years as the very worst of our enemies, that one can come to terms with the magnitude of the change. When Israel was making peace with Egypt in the late 1970s, it took many conversations with Gen.Muhammad Abdel Ghany al-Gamasi, the mastermind of the 1973 Suez Canal crossing, and his colleagues to convince me that president Anwar Sadat had solid backing. The same applies here. If these people the most prominent ofthe Kalashnikov-wielders and the initiators of bombings and hijackings try to convince us that they have set out on a new path, they make Yasser Arafat's promises more believable.
True, peace is made with politicians people like Arafat, Abu Mazen, Yasser Abd-Rabbo. But peace can stand steadily on its feet only when those who have spent their lives making war opt for peace.
That is what is happening now. The PLO echelon most in favor of the agreement, the one which wants a complete change in the organization prior to its move into the territories, consists of the graduates of Israeli prisons: Intifada leaders who spent long terms inside, members of terror apparatuses like the "Western Sector." Yasser Arafat and Abu Mazen could never have signed what they did without this push from below.
I have had many conversations with Mamdouh Nofar, the man responsible for the 1974 operation at Ma'alot, in which 20 Israeli schoolchildren were killed in an attempt to take hostages; with the initiators of terror and subversion in the territories; with the man who recently planned the dispatch of an agent to murder one of Israel's most prominent personalities. It seems to me that they are prepared, even determined, to work for the success of the agreement, with all its weaknesses and all the risks involved.
Avery influential coalition has sprung up around Arafat, made up of the majority of PLO activists in the territories, especially deportees who have risen to top jobs in Tunis; a substantial number of those who controlled the terrorist attacks, and a smaller number from the remnants of what was once the Palestinian Liberation Army and the Fatah brigades. They are united by three highly important motives that go beyond a mere desire to bring the agreement to fruition and to stand up to its opponents: Dedication to establishing a "democratic" leadership when rule in the territories is transferred to the PLO.
This may not mean democracy modeled on the Western pattern, but it is certainly completely different from that practised in some Arab states. They see democracy as a means of guaranteeing quiet, keeping the opposition in check, and attracting foreign investments. Conviction that in the PLO's present form which is neither impressive nor effective it is impossible to transplant it into Gaza and Jericho, but that the organization has to undergo a complete transformation. They advocate total change in the character of the PLO's administration and ideology. They want it to abandon the tradition developed during its years in the underground. There is no doubt that they want the PLO to rule in the future, but they have set their sights on reshaping it as an entirely different PLO. Understanding that the outsiders from Tunis cannot be forced on the territories from on high, and that there must be a comprehensive plan to integrate people from the territories into the Palestinian administration at every level. Instead of superimposing the Palestinian diaspora regime onto the territories, a new partnership should be forged, perhaps with residents of the territories given the major role.
Confronting this coalition, other forces are taking shape just below the surface. The widespread PLO military apparatus branching into Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria and Libya includes hundreds of officers who accompanied Arafat on his long and difficult march. Now, just as they are due to get their expected reward, they are not about to have their hands tied behind their backs. Inside the PLO's unwieldy (and financially pressed) command structure and diplomatic machinery, there are many who fear that when the organization moves to the territories, they will lose status and influence. The older generation also has a psychological block about the agreement, a sense of failure, of having lost the way.
Arafat, of course, doesn't want to lose even one of these groups. A broad consensus is essential for him, especially to overcome growing opposition from the Hamas fundamentalists and the rejectionist Popular and Democratic Fronts. So he is groping toward arrangements that will in some way satisfy everyone. And it goes without saying that overall authority will rest exclusively in his hands, that the last word will be his.
One method he might choose is to establish a "temporary government" to encompass both the self-rule authority (the Palestinians call it the "national authority") in the territories and whatever is to remain of the PLO abroad. Another method would be to bring the veteran soldiers, many of whom are approaching retirement, to the territories in the framework of what they call the "central security forces." They want these people to stay in their camps, to serve as a deterrent or to intervene when necessary, but leaving day-to-day security to the police made up of people from the territories.
Such formulations have to be discussed with Israel and they involve complex problems. Will Rabin allow 6,000-10,000 PLO soldiers to enter the area in addition to a similar number of local police? Will Israel agree to deal with a "temporary government" instead of the "council" which is supposed to be elected in due course?
Now that the agreement has been signed, the main thing is to do everything to assure its success despite all its defects and our reservations. Its failure would be too serious a blow to the chances of ever making peace.
And our guiding principle has to be that everything driving the PLO toward meaningful change and leading it onto the path of semi-democracy, with its face turned toward development, is preferable to a policy that would strengthen those internal PLO forces striving to undermine the agreement and prevent change in the organization.
The agreement was reached with the PLO of old. It should be carried out with a PLO that has undergone a real internal revolution.
Over these past few days in Tunis, I have become convinced that this is certainly possible, but by no means in the palm of our hands. Israel can help bring about the desired outcome by what it does or doesn't do.
We have not been fond of the PLO so far, and there is no reason to fall in love with it now. But the Rabin-Arafat partnership needs a stronger PLO, updated to cope with the new circumstances; a PLO in which those who sent agents to put bombs in movie houses become the counterparts of the Shin Bet, and those who used to fire Katyushas supervise security on the Gaza Strip border.
Confronting the coalition for peace: Popular Front radicals in South Lebanon pose before wall graffiti that reads `Jerusalem is ours'; (opposite) in Tunis, Yasser Arafat receives a strong push from his captains below.
1993
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