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Israel: Will the Arrow Find Its Target?
Leslie Susser
Its makers are confident -- but not certain -- that Israel�s missile defense system can counter any threat from Iraq
It is the stock scenario: with Iraq reeling from a massive American attack, a desperate Saddam Hussein fires Scud missiles at Israel, hoping to drag it into the war and turn other Arab countries against the United States.
But in contrast to the Gulf War of 1991, when American-made Patriot missiles failed to deal with any of the 39 incoming Scuds, this time Israel believes it is ready. Within seconds, any firing should be detected by American satellites and a warning signal flashed. Israel�s Green Pine radar system would immediately map out the Scud�s trajectory and estimated point of impact. An Arrow 2 interceptor missile would streak into space, its electronic eye scanning the skies for the rocket. The Arrow would home in, and explode within 40 meters of the Scud -- showering dozens of "bomblets" in its direction. Several would score direct hits and the Scud and its warhead would explode at a height of some 10 kilometers over Jordanian territory. Even if the first Arrow were to miss its target, Israeli officers at the "Citron Tree" fire control and the "Hazel Nut Tree" launch center, near Kibbutz Palmahim south of Tel Aviv, would have time to fire a second. And even if that failed, improved Patriot PAC-2 missiles could be launched to intercept the Scud at lower altitudes.
That�s the theory. But will the Arrow system work in practice? And if it is successful, does that mean it can answer all of Israel�s future strategic needs? Israel�s Military Intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Aharon Ze�evi, believes these questions will go unanswered during the anticipated American-Iraqi clash, because Iraq won�t fire on Israel. Iraq�s relatively few Scud or Al-Hussein missiles can only reach Israel from the H-3 area of western Iraq. And Ze�evi asserted, in an early October TV interview, that "there are no missiles in western Iraq and no such deployment is planned in the near future." Moreover, if American forces take control of western Iraq at the start of an offensive, as reports from Washington indicate they might, the missile threat to Israel could be reduced to near zero.
But what if Saddam does manage to launch one or more Scuds at Israel? What are the Arrow�s chances of success? According to the men who produced it at Israel Aircraft Industries, about 90 percent. Their reserve derives from the fact that during the 14 years of development, they were never able to test in battle conditions. They simulated -- sending up one Arrow missile from the Mediterranean coast and firing another to shoot it down over the sea; they fired a target missile from an F-15 fighter and shot it down. Eight of the last nine tests were successful. But, as IAI Director of Communications Doron Suslik notes, "in all cases the Arrows had to be fired to the west, in order not to create a diplomatic incident, or worse, with our Arab neighbors. And it is from the east that Iraqi missiles would be fired."
Eitan Ben-Eliahu, air force commander from 1997 to 2000, when key decisions on the Arrow�s development and deployment were made, is less circumspect. He argues that the Arrow experiments were virtually indistinguishable from the real thing: "We are talking about a fixed ballistic course and a meeting in space with a target that doesn�t maneuver. There are far fewer potentially unexpected variables than, say, in a dog fight or a tank battle."
As for the Arrow�s integrated Green Pine radar system, which is key to the interceptor missile�s performance, it has been tested in real conditions and come through with flying colors. Since its installment at Palmahim two years ago, the Syrians have twice secretly tested Scud D missiles. Both times, Green Pine detected the test launches within seconds.
In September, a second Green Pine radar system was installed in the north of the country, along with missile launchers, which means that Israel now has two fully operational and independent Arrow batteries in place, with a third planned for the south in two years� time. The whole country will then, theoretically, be covered against missile attack.
How significant would battle success and wider deployment be from a strategic point of view?
Strategy specialist Reuven Pedatzur of Tel Aviv University, the Arrow�s most uncompromising critic through the years, concedes that the system may well be effective against Saddam�s outmoded Scuds, but argues that it cannot meet new technological challenges and that the concept of missile defense remains as misguided today as it ever was. "It�s very easy nowadays to build a missile that starts behaving unpredictably when it enters the atmosphere. That would be virtually impossible for the Arrow to deal with," he asserts. "True, the crazy missile won�t be able to hit a specific point, but it doesn�t have to. It�s a weapon meant to terrorize and it makes no difference whether it hits Ramat Gan, Petah Tikvah or Tel Aviv."
Pedatzur adds the possibility of an enemy firing clusters of missiles, using decoys and deploying warheads that split up into dozens of small bombs. Any of these, he says, would outsmart the Arrow.
But Ben-Eliahu dismisses these arguments. Deploying the Arrow, he says, might prod the other side into trying to develop more sophisticated missiles, but that would take effort, time and money. And the Arrow can be refined, always staying a step ahead.
Pedatzur�s main concern, though, is that "the Arrow won�t be effective against the main threat of the next decade, the nuclear threat," where only 100 percent defense is relevant. Indeed, he argues that having a missile defense system actually increases Israel�s vulnerability in this sphere. "Nuclear deterrence is only effective if the other side really believes you would use the awesome weapons you have," he says. "By putting up a defensive system you are saying, �First I will try to defend myself.� It would be better to say, �I am not going to defend myself -- so you, the enemy, know what will happen if you even think about trying to attack.�"
Again, Ben-Eliahu disagrees. He says that with the Arrow in place, the enemy must take into account that his attack may fail, but that he will still "be punished in kind... So he will think 10 times before he attacks."
As for the dangers posed by even a single nuclear warhead getting through, Ben-Eliahu argues that this only underlines the need for missile-defense. "The potential destruction by a nuclear strike is so great," Ben Eliahu contends, "that it would be worth having, even if there were only a small chance of prevention."
Ben-Eliahu also rejects criticism that, at a development cost of $2.2 billion (funded 40 percent by the U.S., 60 percent by Israel), and a further outlay of $3 million for every missile fired, the system is just too costly. "I don�t want to give the impression that we can now shelve everything else and go home," he says, but he doesn�t regret "a single dollar" spent on the Arrow.
Does Israel have enough missiles to meet the current Iraqi threat? Absolutely, officials say. As for the future, IAI signed an agreement with Boeing in January, under which the American giant will help speed up production by manufacturing components for assembly in Israel. The first jointly produced missiles are expected to roll off the assembly line in 2004.
What about Jordan�s concern, as conveyed to the air force, that if the Arrow is called into action over its territory, missile debris could come to earth and cause damage there? Israeli generals have reassured the Jordanians that only small, harmless fragments would come down. Pedatzur, however, contends that nobody really knows what the fall-out might be, especially from a Scud carrying chemical or biological agents in the warhead.
If the Arrow is tested in battle soon, and proves effective, IAI officials expect a surge in overseas interest. India has already deployed the Green Pine radar, and put out feelers on buying the rest of the Arrow system. Turkey, Japan and Britain also expressed interest in the past.
But there are major hurdles to be overcome. First the export guidelines of the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) -- which Israel has not ratified but respects -- would have to be satisfied. Second, given the American co-funding, the State Department would have to issue an export license. Presumably Boeing, as a prime contractor, would handle the political lobbying -- with heavier clout than the IAI.
Then the last hurdle would be the price tag: $600-800 million for the basic system. "A government would have to be very rich and very sure it needed the system to go ahead," an IAI official told the Report.
As the government of Israel clearly was.
November 4, 2002
Israel
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