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Iraq�s �Northern Alliance�?
Heidi Kingstone
Washington remains ambivalent toward the Iraqi National Congress, though the opposition in exile claims to be ready to get rid of Saddam
WITH THE BUSH ADMINistration still deliberating over whether or not to take its war against terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, one might expect the main exiled opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein to be gearing up for the tantalizing possibility of a takeover of Baghdad, � la Afghanistan�s Northern Alliance.
Yet the Iraqi National Congress, the American-backed, London-based umbrella group of Iraqi Kurds, Sunnis and Shi�ites dedicated to the downfall of Saddam, is treading water instead of making serious preparations to take power. This is not because of any lack of motivation on the INC�s part, but mainly because the relationship between the administration in Washington and the INC, always problematic, seems as troubled and ambiguous as ever. According to Nabeel Musawi, a high-profile member of the INC, the organization recently rejected an offer of $8 million from the U.S. administration because the money came with conditions: that it neither be used inside Iraq, nor for military purposes. Rather, the Americans requested that the money be used for lobbying public opinion in the Middle East and the West.
"Either we use it inside the country, or we don�t use it at all," fumes Musawi, who believes that Washington is as paralyzed now by its inability to define the endgame in Iraq -- principally the question of who, or what, would replace Saddam -- as it was before, during and after the 1991 Gulf War.
"We believe that the United States is afraid of events in Iraq developing too quickly," says Musawi, "that things will spiral and that they won�t be able to control the change." The INC, for its part, argues that it could establish a democratic republic in Iraq tomorrow.
American policy on Iraq has been tailored for decades by a �better the devil you know� attitude, claim those impatient for change, even though the United States harbors major concerns about weapons of mass destruction in Saddam�s hands.
Washington�s deep ambivalence toward the INC stems from two sources. One involves an ongoing policy dispute over whether the goal should be just to remove Saddam, as both the State Department and the CIA favor, preferably by waiting for an internal coup; or whether -- as the Pentagon, Congress, the Senate, some senior members of the White House and Vice President Dick Cheney, as well as the INC, support -- the goal should be to bring down Saddam, his sons and the entire Ba�ath Party structure, along with the intelligence services, the Republican Guard and all other protectors of the current regime.
The other source of ambivalence stems from longstanding questions about the INC�s credibility. The INC�s supporters, including Iraqi intellectuals and liberals, claim that if and when it takes power, it would usher in a new era of democracy and justice in Iraq. But to its critics, the INC reeks of ineffective disunity and is dismissed as a flamboyant, over-financed talking shop that fits more comfortably in London�s elegant Knightsbridge district, where its HQ is located, than in the rugged deserts or streets of Baghdad where the battle against Saddam must be waged.
Moreover, they point to the potential havoc that could be caused by an unsuccessful, INC-led takeover: regional power grabs by local militias for the Kurd-ish north, the Shi�ite south and the Sunni center of the country, resulting in frag-ment-ation, civil war and a failed state along the lines of pre-2001 Afghanistan. The prospect fills powerbrokers from London to Washington to Riyadh with horror.
"The State Department is on an all-out attack to discredit us so that their theory of change through a coup will win the day," says Musawi. "The �silver bullet� theory is that someone inside the regime will kill Saddam. We�ve been waiting 12 years for that to happen, and it hasn�t yet. They know they are losing the argument rapidly."
Still, according to one philosophy, maintaining stability in the region is paramount, and the notion of keeping the Iraqi structure intact is appealing.
So while Washington plays again with idea of removing Saddam, practically nothing, it seems, is being done to activate the INC, with the exception of some small financial gestures. The INC has received less than $10 million of the $97 million allotted to it under the Iraq Liberation Act passed by Congress in 1997. Most of the funds came through during the past 12 months. According to INC sources, less than $500,000 has been spent on military training in the United States for Saddam�s opponents. The rest has gone on establishing a network of offices in London, Washington, Teheran and Damascus, and setting up the satellite Liberty TV station and an opposition newspaper, Al-Moutamar.
The INC has also concentrated recently on its campaign to bring out Iraqi defectors and present them to the media (see box), including former scientists and members of Iraq�s security forces whose damning testimonies have revealed details of Saddam�s secret non-conventional weapons programs and terrorist training camp at Salman Pak, complete with a grounded airplane for hijack practice.
IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT Washington will opt, in the end, to attack Iraq. "It�s more of a policy option than policy at the moment," thinks Michael O�Hanlon, senior fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Washington-based Brookings Institute. "It�s an extraordinarily divisive issue, and there is no point in doing the classic Washington bureaucracy thing of voicing the opposite sides in the debate and then just compromising, which was essentially what the Clinton administration did: Use a little bit of force fairly frequently all to not much effect. I think this administration recognizes that if you are going to do it, you have to do it right."
Doing it right, suggests O�Hanlon, means providing major protection for an Iraqi opposition as it begins to form and arm itself. "More likely," continues O�Hanlon, "it requires a major American military effort."
Military analyst and Washington Post columnist William Arkin agrees a war on Iraq may not be looming tomorrow, but says that if the war against terrorism is to be concluded, "eventually it will occur. The option most gaining momentum," he says, "is proving that smart sanctions and inspections are not going to work. But the State Department is fairly adamant that they be given at least a six-month period to work."
Arkin, who is no fan of the INC, believes that in the event the United States takes on the Baghdad regime, it would be important to see to what degree the middle class and Iraq�s own military would become an opposition force. "There is no evi-dence," he says, "that the INC has ever put together any kind of viable network inside Iraq. And if there is one thing Saddam is good at, it is internal security."
The INC dismisses that kind of talk. They know that overthrowing Saddam requires full American support, but they are looking for logistical support including vehicles, guns and mobile hospitals, and the buildup of a ground force that would be supported, Afghanistan-style, by Western air power. "There is no way to do it without ground troops," says Musawi. "Someone must be there to take possession."
The INC has not been waiting for Washington to supply it with a plan of campaign, its activists say. Thousands of professional Iraqi officers, graduates from military academies all over the world, are said to have joined the opposition ranks over the past few years. They live in the north and south of Iraq, across the borders in Turkey, Syria and Iran, and as far afield as the United States.
"We have manpower available in huge quantities in the north and south of Iraq," says Musawi, who reckons that a reputable force could be put together within six months. "We�ve had to deal with Saddam for 32 years. It�s fine if he survives for another few months while we organize ourselves."
AS FAR AS O�HANLON IS CONcerned, dislodging Saddam will take much more than airpower and a local opposition ground force. In his view, anything short of a ground invasion by U.S. troops, who he believes will have to go it alone, would be bound to fail. A serious U.S. commitment would, by his estimates, translate into 150,000-300,000 troops.
"You have to imagine that even if all the opposition forces are aggregated, they have the strength of about one-tenth of the Iraqi armed forces," he surmises. "The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces, loyal to Saddam, total about 100,000 personnel. They realize they are not going to be given the same treatment that the Taliban managed to negotiate."
Unless the Americans were to storm Baghdad, the naysayers argue, the wholesale capitulation of Saddam�s security and political elite, which is pampered with villas and cars, seems unlikely.
"Of course they would support Saddam Hussein," opines Musawi. "They have the country. But they don�t have the people."
Furthermore, Musawi points out, Iraq�s Russian tanks are 30 years old, and while they may be polished to a shine and intimidate civilians, they are not militarily significant. O�Hanlon counters that the Ba�athist regime is able to maintain the tanks adequately.
As for the repeated charges, particularly in Britain where the INC is based, that the organization is fractious and lacks the ability to deliver its utopian promises of a post-Saddam Iraq, Musawi acknowledges that INC factions disagree politically on issues such as whether Iraq should be centrally ruled or organized federally. But he asks whether that isn�t the essence of democracy.
"We disagree politically, but don�t they do that in the Senate and in Parliament?" he asks. "We all say that Iraq must remain united, become democratic and abide by U.N. resolutions. Do we all have to sing from the same song sheet?"
Critic Arkin doesn�t put much store by that. "You say Iraqi opposition, which connotes one thing. This is wrong," he says. "The Kurdish forces in the north not only control Iraqi real estate, but also have a far greater military capability" than any of the other component parts of the opposition, he says. "The INC is a group of London ex-pats who have no identifiable military presence."
INC detractors also point to the lack of support the alliance generates in other Arab countries. But Musawi maintains that the Saudis, Egyptians and even the Kuwaitis can�t offer support because if they did, it could only be interpreted as support for the INC�s ideals as well as its intention of getting rid of Saddam. "The next thing, their people would ask why their own illegitimate and fragile regimes aren�t implementing the exact same principles of democracy and pluralism," he says.
Finally, the INC believes, what costs it Arab and wider Iraqi support is a profound fear of retribution among potential allies should Saddam be subjected to American attack -- and survive again. During the Gulf War, the Arab countries joined the Western coalition confident that Saddam was on his last legs. In the aftermath, they were left feeling vulnerable and exposed.
The question today for many inside and outside Iraq remains the one of American resolve to see any attack on the country through to a post-Saddam end. When it comes to Washington�s relationship with the INC, though, it appears that resolve is not yet the operative word.
(Jamuary 28, 2002)
Middle East
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