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Still Juggling
Once again, reports of Arafat�s demise have proved premature. But while he now seems ebullient, his colleagues say privatelythey know his regime is in deep trouble.
Khaled Abu Toameh Ramallah
EVEN YASSER ARAFAT�S closest advisers can�t remember when their boss was last in such a fine mood, so quick to laugh and crack jokes.
It is late December, two weeks after Israel put him under virtual town arrest in Ramallah, and the 72-year-old Palestinian leader, a frequent flier who has rarely stayed in one place for more than a week, appears ebullient, sometimes to the point of an irrational euphoria. Bouncing back after Palestinian suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Haifa sparked an international diplomatic offensive against him and an Israeli military offensive against his Palestinian Authority, Arafat seems defiant and bellicose.
He grabs the hand of all those who visit him at his office in the presidential compound in northern Ramallah and leads them to the window. "You see, Israeli tanks are only 70 meters away from here," he says to one guest, pointing to a hilltop. The hill has been taken over by the Israeli army following the Jerusalem carnage; troops have knocked down Voice of Palestine radio towers. An aide tries to correct him, noting that the tanks are actually a few hundred meters away. A smiling Arafat lays a hand on his shoulder and retorts: "Have you forgotten that I�m a trained engineer and that I know everything about measurements?"
When a group of pro-Palestinian American and British demonstrators lies down in front of the Israeli armored vehicles on the hilltop, Arafat watches the drama unfold from his office. He later receives them and tells them that the situation reminds him of the 80-day Beirut siege back in 1982 after Israel invaded Lebanon. The irony of that comparison -- the siege ended with the PLO being driven from Lebanon -- apparently escapes him. He exchanges kisses and hugs with each of these supporters.
The euphoria represents a radical shift in Arafat�s always mercurial mood, following black depression during the first week of the crisis. What makes the swing in spirits striking is that the political and military reality has not changed: Arafat remains at the edge of a political abyss. Nor does his sudden effervescence seem to stem from what he sees as the imminent triumph of some grand strategy for the future. Rather, it appears Arafat simply believes that once again he has succeeded at what he does best -- appeasing everyone just enough, even if satisfying no one, and holding on. And if other top Palestinians believe that this is a dangerous game, none has yet been willing to say so out loud.
THE FIRST DAYS OF ARAFAT�S town arrest were, according to Palestinian officials, very tough on him. For the first time since the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994, he felt he was about to lose everything he�d built during the Oslo process, along with his international credibility. The pressure on him to take drastic measures against Hamas and Islamic Jihad fundamentalists came from almost every corner in the world. As one adviser put it, "They squeezed the juice out of the president."
Arafat, says a close aide, went so far as to phone Egyptian President Mubarak and ask him for political asylum. The same aide says Arafat told some of his visitors he was seriously considering retiring from political life. Of course, most treated this, rightly, as another of Arafat�s stories.
What most worried him was the talk in the U.S. and Europe about the end of the "Arafat era." One EU official looked Arafat in the eye and told him: "Mr. Chairman, we don�t believe that you can continue to be the leader of the Palestinian people, because you aren�t in control."
Explains a Palestinian official: "Arafat is used to hearing pleasantries from the Americans and the Europeans. Suddenly the tone changed. He took it personally."
For many, that humiliation of Arafat served as yet another reminder of the PA�s weakness. Cynical analysts say the situation reminded them of the early 80s, when then-defense minister Sharon sacked elected Palestinian mayors in the West Bank and replaced them with Israeli military governors. "Sharon has now appointed Arafat as the mayor or military governor of Ramallah," said a Palestinian journalist, joking bitterly.
The pressure on Arafat grew as the talk about a possible successor increased. U.S. officials began sounding out their Palestinian counterparts about the need to find a suitable heir. According to an official at Arafat�s Ramallah office, ex-general Anthony Zinni, the U.S. peace envoy to the Mideast, delivered a tough and personal message: "He told Arafat that this was his last chance to prove himself the leader of the Palestinian people and to start acting against terror. Arafat understood that the Americans would not prevent Sharon from finishing him off."
It was the first time since the Lebanon War that Arafat felt he was being directly targeted and that there was an "international conspiracy" to get rid of him. He closely monitored the reports in the Western and Israeli media about the "post-Arafat era" and read the list of names of the possibles slated to succeed him. At one stage, he summoned his close aides to a pre-dawn meeting and reportedly told them, "The Americans and Sharon are planning a coup against me."
Arafat�s panic was clearly reflected in the unusual step of granting an interview to Oded Granot of Israel TV�s Channel 1, broadcast on Friday night prime time on December 7. Trying to address the Israeli public over the heads of Sharon and the government, he asserted that he was genuinely cracking down on Hamas, asked rhetorically, "I am Bin Laden? I am Taliban?" and added, as an afterthought, "We extend our hand in peace," only after an aide was clearly heard in the background telling him to do so. On screen, Arafat seemed anxious, his eyes rolling; he regularly chastised the interviewer for interrupting him; and he launched an utterly counterproductive assault on American policy. The result hardly reassured Israeli viewers or boosted his international support.
Reflecting the depth of his personal crisis, Palestinian newspapers started running front-page advertisements of "support and allegiance for His Excellency, the President of the State of Palestine." The ads were meant to be perceived as the spontaneous gestures of clans and important families, institutions and organizations, as well as political factions. In fact, all were ordered by people in Arafat�s immediate circle, in an attempt to show the world that the chairman still enjoyed the support of his people.
"The feeling among the Palestinians, including President Arafat himself, is that the U.S. and Israel are waging a campaign against him in person," said Dr. Mahmud Muhareb, a political analyst from Jerusalem. "What they don�t understand is that Arafat is not just a politician or an ordinary leader -- he is a symbol, a historical figure. If anyone thinks that by getting rid of Arafat things will change for the better, they are mistaken."
BUT ARAFAT�S MOOD CHANGED almost overnight, after he decided on the desperate gambit of his televised December 16 speech in Arabic, in which he called on Palestinians to stop all armed operations. The appeal indicated that he had finally realized external pressure could bring about his downfall. At the same time, he had evidently concluded that he could count on the exhaustion of his public, after 15 months of conflict, to produce wide acceptance of his demand.
Arafat�s decision to change direction, say Palestinian sources, came after consulting only with his three or four closest advisers, none of whom is willing to discuss who pushed in what direction. What�s clear, though, is that Arafat sought to appease the U.S. and Europe while sticking to all of his basic positions including a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. "I am confident that our national consensus will remain firmly focused on the objectives of freedom, independence, the building of an independent Palestinian state with its capital of Jerusalem," he said in the address, also specifying the need for implementation of UN Resolution 194 -- a code word for the "right of return."
His message in the speech and since has been that the Islamic fundamentalists behind the suicide bombings are playing into the hands of Sharon and making it possible for Israel to continue collective punishments. He also played the national unity card, saying the attacks threaten Palestinian consensus.
Under pressure from Zinni, Arafat ordered his security forces to start closing down Hamas and Islamic Jihad institutions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Within two days of the speech, PA officials claimed they�d closed 19 offices in Gaza. The same week, Israel reported that 15 Palestinian policemen had been arrested -- the first Palestinian detention of policemen involved in attacks against Israel. Muhammad Dahlan, head of Palestinian Preventive Security in Gaza, asserted: "We will arrest anyone who violates Authority decisions." And Arafat�s Fatah movement announced it supported a temporary truce.
Yet in his bid to satisfy everyone, he avoided any real confrontation with Hamas. Privately, many Palestinian officials note that the institutions and offices that were shut down had nothing to do with Hamas or Islamic Jihad militants. "We had to do something to demonstrate to the Americans that we are serious about fighting violence," admits a Palestinian security official who asked not to be named. "The Americans like this, they pressured us to take action. We told them that these offices are involved in social and cultural activities, not in violence, but they wouldn�t listen." In effect, the Palestinian officials acknowledge, Arafat exploited American ignorance.
Likewise, the arrests are only intended for the American and Israeli public. When they were detained, according to some Hamas activists who have already been released, they were told that they were being taken into custody for their protection. And they were held in private apartments rather than real prisons.
Even so, Arafat met resistance. In Gaza, where Hamas is strongest, an attempt by the Palestinian police to arrest Hamas spokesman Abd al-Aziz Rantisi was blocked by armed supporters. Four policemen were shot in the legs, and one demonstrator was killed. At his funeral, hundreds of protesters attacked a police station in Jabalya refugee camp. Six of the attackers were shot dead.
Arafat managed to keep the protests from spreading -- at the price of backing down and not arresting Rantisi. It was another sign that rather than having a strategy, the PA leader is engaged in a juggling act -- to simultaneously mollify the U.S. and Europe, West Bank Palestinians tired of the uprising and the Islamic activists.
In return, Hamas�s political leaders agreed to order the suspension of terror attacks within Israel proper. They hoped the announcement would ease international pressure on Arafat, and that Arafat in turn would let up on Hamas and the smaller Islamic Jihad.
It remains an open question, though, whether the Hamas military wing -- which is largely independent -- would keep to the agreement. The Islamic Jihad has explicitly said it will not. The agreement also left room for Hamas to continue attacks in the territories on soldiers and settlers. That hardly satisfies Israel, which is maintaining its pressure on Arafat. Moreover, past experience shows that the first Israeli assassination of a Palestinian activist, if Israel renews what it calls its "focused prevention policy," would provide Hamas with an excuse to end any restraint.
Beyond the Islamic activists, domestic reaction is hard to measure. A December opinion poll, conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), showed that 80 percent of the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported continuation of the uprising and 58 percent believed Arafat�s decision to call a halt to "resistance activities" was unjustified. Furthermore, 64 percent continued to support suicide bombings.
Yet many Palestinians privately express the opposite view -- a deep fatigue and a desire to return to a more peaceful life. It appears that some answer pollsters with the "politically correct" pro-uprising view, whether or not that�s their true feeling.
In the same way, relatives of "martyrs" -- who have been killed in confrontations with Israeli troops or in suicide attacks -- will say on camera that they are proud; off-camera, they weep and say they want an end to the suffering. In his bid for calm, therefore, Arafat was gambling that he could satisfy both the patriotic feelings and the desire for quiet.
ARAFAT BELIEVES THE GAM-ble has worked. He regained his self-confidence after the speech when he started receiving messages from various governments expressing their support for him and in effect rejecting the Israeli government�s December 13 decision to declare him "irrelevant." According to Palestinian spokesmen, the Americans and Europeans sent urgent messages reassuring Arafat that they continue to regard him as the "legitimate leader of the Palestinian people."
Yet the letup in pressure on Arafat is illusory. He has yet to arrest the real terror activists and disarm their underground organization. And even if the U.S. and Europe appear to have eased the pressure a little, Israel has made it clear that it still regards Arafat�s measures as insufficient.
From the outside, it seems clear that the next terror attack will leave Arafat even more exposed, his "crackdown" revealed as empty talk. Pressure will rise again. According to some Palestinian officials, American and European diplomats are saying in private meetings that they are impressed with Col. Jibril Rajoub, head of the preventative security agency in the West Bank, and would be happy to see him replace Arafat. The colonel is one of the few Palestinian security officials who maintain excellent ties with the CIA and the Israeli security forces. Indeed, Hamas leaflets have accused him of helping the Israelis in the assassination of Islamic activists.
Rajoub, who spent 17 years in Israeli prisons, is a charismatic leader. He commands some 5,000 security agents and an additional 20,000 unofficial Fatah activists. As someone who has spent nearly his whole life in the West Bank, he is familiar with Israelis, and speaks Hebrew fluently. He is therefore more ready than Arafat and others who returned to the territories only in recent years to address Israeli concerns on matters such as security. Unlike his ally Sari Nusseibeh, the outspoken Palestinian diplomatic liaison in Jerusalem, he will not say publicly that Palestinians must compromise on the right of return; it seems that most of the Palestinian leadership agrees with Nusseibeh privately and fears saying so publicly.
Rajoub does not have the arena to himself. Leaders of other security bodies -- such as Gaza preventative security chief Dahlan and Ghazi Jabali, the head of the Palestinian police -- see themselves as potential heirs too. As for veteran leaders such as Abu Mazen, secretary general of the PLO executive committee, and Abu Ala, speaker of the Palestine Legislative Council, they might also seek to succeed Arafat -- but could only do so with the backing of security chiefs like Rajoub and Dahlan.
As Arafat sees it, he has overcome the crisis. For proof, his aides note that neither high Palestinian officials nor academic analysts in Ramallah are willing to publicly criticize his actions or policies. Those officials and analysts may well believe he is overconfident -- but will not risk saying so out loud. And so, protected from criticism by successful intimidation, the PA leader happily surveys a superficially supportive hierarchy.
His ebullience sometimes seems to border on megalomania. Arafat has been telling visitors that he is determined to bring Sharon down. One recent visitor quotes Arafat as declaring that he sees himself as one of the greatest generals in Middle East history.
Says one former Arafat adviser bitterly: "Arafat lives from one crisis to another. He doesn�t have long-term planning. As long as he�s OK now, that�s what counts. As for the far future, he doesn�t seem to care that much."
Adds a Palestinian academic: "Only God and Arafat know what�s inside Arafat�s mind. I never understood this man. I�m not sure that he himself knows what he�s doing."
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Palestinian Affairs
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© The Jerusalem Report 1999-2001 |  |