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In mid-October, a group of Israelis and Palestinians finalized an unofficial draft for a peace agreement sponsored by the Swiss Foreign Ministry and dubbed the "Geneva Accord." The Israelis, including Oslo architect Yossi Beilin and author Amos Oz -- all from the political left and all acting independently of the government -- say the accord disproves the widely held belief that there is no Palestinian partner for peace. According to its Israeli drafters, the agreement would see Israel giving up sovereignty over the Temple Mount, while the Palestinians would give up the right of return. (Palestinian officials say there is no concession on the right of return, but rather that any such return would require Israeli consent.) Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders, with the exception of Jerusalem suburbs built over the Green Line and much of the Etzion Bloc, ceding land in the Negev in return for territory annexed. The Palestinian state would be demilitarized, would recognize Israel as a Jewish state, and would disarm all militias. The agreement has been blasted in Israel. Prime Minister Sharon says it undermines any chance of real negotiations; Justice Minister Tommy Lapid has called the Israeli negotiators irresponsible; former prime minister Ehud Barak has termed the document "delusional." Barak�s successor as Labor chairman, MK Amram Mitzna, played a central role in the Geneva negotiations. Here he offers a defense of the document and the talks that produced it. The Jerusalem Report: Israel has an elected government. What right do you have to conduct peace negotiations? Amram Mitzna: It is the natural right of every Israeli citizen to try and rescue the country from the political deadlock. Were the government negotiating, our efforts would indeed constitute interference. But the government has completely shut off the possibility of dialogue with the Palestinians. Was the prime minister kept abreast of the talks? We did not update him every day. But there was not a moment when the government did not know what was going on. What are the central elements of the accord? It is a model for a final-status agreement. It includes Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state and the home of the Jewish people. When it is put into effect, it will cancel all Palestinian demands from Israel, and of course, our demands from them. Who represented the Palestinians? There has never been a group like the one we met. It includes members of the veteran leadership, like Yasser Abed Rabbo; members of the leadership of the interim generation, like Zoheir Manasra; and perhaps most importantly, leaders of the next generation, from the Palestinian street. This group includes Fares Kadoura, Mohammed Khourani and Hisham Abd el-Razek, who sat 21 years in Israeli prison. Did the Palestinian leadership support them? If the leadership had told them to stop, they would have. Abu Ala and Abu Mazen called Yasser Abed Rabbo after we wrapped up, to wish him well, and I understand that Arafat did as well. Critics say that the accord does not end Palestinian demands for a right of return. It was agreed that Israel will decide who and how many people will be allowed to enter its territory. From the moment that the decision regarding "if," "who," and "how many" becomes an Israeli one, there is no right except Israel�s right to decide. We could decide not to allow anyone to return. But for there to be an opening, the agreement says, in English, that Israel will "consider" allowing the entry of a number of Palestinians equal to the average number of Palestinians accepted by third party countries -- the U.S., Canada, Germany and others. From informal checks, it appears that the number will be between 20-40,000. That is the maximum, as I see it. And the 200,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem will become citizens of Palestine. The phrase "right of return" appears nowhere in the document. There�s no reference to our responsibility for creating the refugee problem. Will Israelis support an agreement that gives up sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem? We all know that we have no de facto status on the Temple Mount today. This accord just maintains the situation. We agreed to Palestinian sovereignty on the Temple Mount, but we designed an international monitoring force to make sure there�ll be no archaeological digs, no changes without mutual agreement. And of course, unlike today, the Temple Mount will be open to everyone, including Jews. On the other hand, we get full sovereignty over the Western Wall, and divided sovereignty in the Old City, but under an open regime. I hope we�ll be able to explain to Israelis that yes, these are painful things, but sovereign Israeli Jerusalem will be the biggest it has been since the Kingdoms of Israel: Ma�aleh Adumim, Pisgat Ze�ev, Neveh Ya�akov, Givat Ze�ev -- all under our sovereignty. If we�d been offered something like this the day after the Six-Day War, we would have been dancing in the streets. After a formal signing ceremony in Geneva, we intend to begin a major campaign. Every Israeli home will receive a booklet with the details of the agreement. We�ll go from door to door. The Palestinians plan to do the same thing, and when Hisham Abd el-Razek stands in the middle of the Jebalya camp and says, "Friends, I approve of this agreement," they will follow him. Why, after the Oslo process failure, should we believe in a new accord, especially knowing of the Palestinian Authority�s involvement in terrorism? I don�t believe. That�s why I want an agreement. This accord involves a process, and international monitoring. If it fails, God forbid, we return to the terrible situation in which we find ourselves today. We will have lost nothing. But I can tell you that something is happening on the other side. The past three years, the terrible destruction, the loss of their international legitimacy, all have led them to ask questions. Am I certain this process will work? No. But when two sides make an agreement, it�s not about trusting each other. It�s about the chances you take, the chances of success, and the stages at which the other side�s trustworthiness is judged. November 3, 2003
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