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The Amazing Rise of Marwan Barghouti
Isabel Kershner
Emerging from relative obscurity before the intifada, the Tanzim head is now being touted as a potential leader in a post-Arafat era. He and his militant 'young guard' have served notice to the PLO's founding fathers.
IF THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA HAS left in its wake a trail of casualties in the Palestinian political arena, including PLO veterans who have staked their reputations on a negotiated settlement with Israel, it has also produced one rising star: Marwan Barghouti, the acknowledged head of the Tanzim, Fatah's armed militia in the West Bank.
Despite the fact that the small, mustachioed Barghouti was a bureaucratic non-entity with little public profile until a few years ago, and that even today his charisma levels and political smarts are largely uncharted, seasoned Palestinian analysts, as well as some members of the Israeli defense establishment, believe he will be a major player in any post-Arafat era. Some see him as a future leader of the Palestinian cause.
Recent surveys carried out by the two most reliable Palestinian polling organizations, Khalil Shikaki's Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Ghassan Khatib's Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, both found Barghouti to be, respectively, the "most popular" and the "most trusted" Palestinian after Palestinian Authority head Yasser Arafat and Hamas mentor Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
Given that Arafat has presided for the past eight years over a corrupt, power-greedy system that Barghouti and his grassroots comrades openly despise, and that the squeaky-voiced Yassin gets his votes more for uncompromising hostility to Israel than for magnetic charm, that might be no great compliment. Still, Barghouti's meteoric rise embodies many of the currents now coursing through Palestinian society, making him a force to be reckoned with.
It's easy to see how Barghouti got his break. "The intifada is popular, and he stands for the intifada," says Bir Zeit University political scientist and JMCC head Khatib. "People go with whoever is showing the most resistance to the occupation."
No doubt Barghouti's newfound popularity is partly to do with exposure. Speaking fluent Hebrew picked up in Israeli jails and decent English, Barghouti has become an intifada media commodity, a far cry from the post-Oslo 1990s when journalists would visit him in Ramallah only as a last resort.
But it's more than name recognition, says Shikaki, also a Bir Zeit political scientist. "Marwan is being perceived as a potential leader. He is for the 'armed struggle' and believes violence is an essential component in establishing the Palestinian state. He says, and is, everything the public wants to hear and believe."
Barghouti, 42, the general secretary of Fatah in the West Bank and an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, has raised his popularity from 2 to 11 percent in Shikaki's polls over the past six months (compared to Arafat's 36 percent and Yassin's 14). According to indications from the ground, he has also managed to extend his geographical power base during the same period, beyond his former stomping ground of Ramallah and its environs into other cities of the West Bank such as Nablus, Tul Karm and Qalqilya.
(In the JMCC poll, where those surveyed had to come up with their most trusted candidates themselves rather than being presented with a list, Barghouti came in third with a much-lower 2.7 percent to Arafat's 24.5 and Yassin's 12.8. Over 33 percent said they didn't trust anyone at all.)
OVER 16 MONTHS AGO, WITH the outbreak of the intifada, the Fatah Tanzim brought its guns out of storage and trained them on Israeli soldiers, settlers and the post-1967 Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo. Over 120 Israelis have been killed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since then, mostly by the Tanzim.
Recently, Tanzim gunmen have also undertaken suicide missions inside Israel. Fatah terrorists killed six guests at a bat mitzvah party in Haderah, and two women in Jerusalem's Jaffa Road, in what were described as revenge attacks following Israel's mid-January assassination of Raed Karmi, a local Tanzim militia leader in Tul Karm, who was said to be responsible for killing nine Israelis. The Palestinian woman who blew herself up on Jaffa Road on January 27 was also affiliated with Fatah.
Barghouti has declared time and again that the Palestinian "resistance" must continue, Hizballah style, until Israel has withdrawn from the 1967 territories. He openly sanctions operations against soldiers and settlers in the territories, but has said he is strongly opposed to attacks on civilians inside Israel.
Nevertheless, Israeli security sources linked Barghouti directly with the Haderah bat-mitzvah bloodbath � an action that Fatah spokespeople put down to a desire for revenge by close comrades of Raed Karmi, and to a lack of discipline in the ranks. After the fatal shooting of a Greek monk in a case of mistaken identity on the Jerusalem-Ma'aleh Adumim road last June, security sources determined that Barghouti was directly responsible for having armed and sent out the attackers. Israel's Justice Ministry issued a warrant for his extradition last September for his alleged involvement in abetting the murder of Israelis.
Such declarations may have helped Barghouti build up his popular credentials, but he is not resting on his laurels. Rather, in what smacks of an attempt to build a mini-personality cult, he has made half a career out of being a self-proclaimed target for assassination by Israel.
Barely a month into the intifada, he began sleeping away from home. Last August, one of Barghouti's senior aides was injured by Israeli missiles in Ramallah in a failed assassination attempt. And during a recent army incursion into Ramallah, Israeli troops temporarily took over the Barghouti family's apartment.
Barghouti never answers his own phones, and though once always available to journalists, some joke that he has recently become harder to reach than Arafat. His aides declined to arrange an interview with Barghouti � who has readily spoken to The Report in the past � for this article.
In the meantime, Barghouti has gone international. In an opinion piece published in The Washington Post on January 21, he argued that his right as an "oppressed person" to protect himself and resist the Israeli occupation "may well lead to my assassination. So let my position be clear in order that my death not be lightly dismissed by the world as just one more statistic in Israel's 'war on terrorism,'" he wrote.
And in a blunter vein days later, during an interview with Israel's Channel 2 news, he warned, or threatened, the Israeli public, in contradiction with his own purported principles of resistance, that his assassination would spark retaliation that would claim dozens of Israeli civilians' lives.
Palestinian analysts see Barghouti's personal campaign as a form of "life insurance." Yet knowledgeable Israeli sources say it is unlikely that Barghouti is on Israel's hit list for now, though that could change depending on the nature of the evidence against him. Most likely, they say, Israel wants to scare Barghouti and keep him more preoccupied with his personal security and less free to run the intifada.
One security source goes farther. "I promise you that Barghouti won't be killed," he claims. "We prefer Barghouti to somebody we don't know. And more than that," he adds � surprisingly, given the allegations against Barghouti, "He has potential as one of the pragmatic young guard. He really can be a leader."
NOT EVERYONE IS IMPRESSED with Barghouti's leadership potential. He is seen as "not serious" in some Israeli quarters, and as a danger to Israel's security in others. One senior PA official, asked about Barghouti's chances, responded "Don't make me laugh."
"Marwan may be very good at leading some university students," the official went on, referring to Barghouti's activities as head of the Bir Zeit students' union during the 1980s, "but when it comes to the Palestinian map and realpolitik, he's not up there. How many foreign consuls does he know? How many Arab leaders? They barely know him in the villages around Ramallah."
Speaking in his favor, an Israeli source who recently left the defense establishment highlights Barghouti's connections with Israel. "His family has a lot of links," he states, adding that four months ago, Barghouti himself met with a senior defense official involved with Israeli-Palestinian liaison. "There are phone calls," he goes on. "If he makes a request, we will answer."
The PA official retorts that if Israel wants "to make up leaders, it won't work here. There is no Lahad among the Palestinians," he declares, referring to Gen. Antoine Lahad, the head of the South Lebanon Army, Israel's proxy in South Lebanon that collapsed on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal.
The rise of Barghouti, and the distaste he arouses in some PA circles, reveals the division and bitter competition that has become apparent in the Palestinian arena between the Fatah young guard � roughly defined as the local grass-roots leadership and their "insider" partners in the PA who grew up under Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, matured during the first intifada of 1987-93 and spent time in Israeli jails � and the "old guard," the "outsider" PLO founders and veterans who were allowed to return to the Palestinian territories from Tunis as a result of the Oslo Accords.
Palestinian analysts insist that the politically pragmatic young guard is not seeking to replace Arafat, but rather need him and want him on their side. Nevertheless, they have clearly positioned themselves for a power grab in the post-Arafat era.
"The day this intifada erupted, the old guard was served its notice," says Shikaki. "The young guard announced it was taking over both in terms of the leadership of the intifada, and in building the state. Their basic message is that the old guard has failed to end the occupation, to establish good governance or to build the state."
For the young guard, the Al-Aqsa Intifada serves as a double-edged sword, against Israel and against the former PA structure that cut them out of the centers of power and decision-making since Oslo.
And while Barghouti and his thousands of Tanzim fighters gave their full support to the Oslo process in the 1990s, they now oppose Palestinian negotiations with Israel, for the simple reason that such an approach perpetuates the political relevancy of Arafat's "old guard" negotiators � and until recently his presumed potential successors � Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala).
Shikaki notes that the Sharon government's policy of not negotiating under fire gives the Tanzim militants, together with their Hamas and Islamic Jihad allies in the intifada, veto power over any negotiation process. "They can start shooting outside their doors at the nearest Israeli settlement and veto any negotiation, without having to openly come out against it," he says.
Arafat, for his part, is trying, typically, to appease both camps. Since the Sharon government came to power, the Palestinian leader seems to have tilted more toward the Tanzim. But if Abu Mazen and Abu Ala are able to succeed in what appears to be a last ditch attempt to patch together a deal with Israel � via recent meetings with Prime Minister Sharon, Sharon's son Omri, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and others � Palestinian analysts say he would most likely put his weight behind that.
Ironically, while the "old guard" derives its legitimacy solely from Arafat, says Shikaki, when it comes to the young guard, Arafat has to seek his own popular legitimacy from them.
Shikaki splits the "young guard" into four groups: the "warlords" in the field, whose names are better known to Israeli military intelligence than to the general public; the political echelon represented by the likes of Barghouti and Nablus PLC representative Husam Khader; the "integrated" insiders like Preventive Security chiefs Jibril Rajoub in the West Bank and Muhammad Dahlan in Gaza, who have official PA roles and take their orders from Arafat; and the "non-violent" stream like PLO Jerusalem official Sari Nusseibeh and Hanan Ashrawi, whose relevancy only comes into play in a peaceful environment.
It was assumed before the Al-Aqsa Intifada that Arafat would be succeeded when the time came, at least nominally, by an heir from among the PLO founding fathers � most probably his No. 2 in the PLO hierarchy, Abu Mazen, with the backing of Rajoub, his chief ally in the security forces.
But with the shift in forces over the past 16 months, the picture has become more complex. Rajoub and Dahlan are assumed to have political ambitions of their own. And if their peers and natural comrades in the "young guard" appear to have the upper hand, the security chiefs will doubtless throw their weight behind them.
Another factor that looms large is the potential of the Hamas fundamentalist movement. According to Palestinian polls, the Islamic groups have increased their popular support during the course of the current intifada to around 27 percent, at times even overtaking Fatah. "Public opinion worries Fatah a lot," says the JMCC's Khatib. "When we publish polls, their people come to us for further analysis."
Just as Arafat needs the support of Fatah � "without Fatah, Arafat doesn't scare anybody," Khatib notes � Rajoub and Dahlan would need the support of the broad-based Fatah movement in any post-Arafat era. "The security apparatuses can be taken care of very easily by Hamas if they don't have the support of Fatah," Khatib goes on. "On our side, it's not about military strength, but popularity."
In the meantime, Barghouti has carved himself out a special role vis � vis Arafat. Despite frequent reports of tension between the two, sources describe the pair as "useful" to each other. Barghouti now acts as the intermediary, or ambassador, between Arafat and the Tanzim.
And though Barghouti swears he won't call off the intifada until Israel's withdrawal from the 1967 lands, he worked to implement the cease-fire that Arafat called in mid-December under huge international pressure, and that resulted in three weeks of relative quiet. Palestinians who know Barghouti say he was very supportive of it.
FOR ALL HIS POPULARITY, though, it is far from clear that Marwan Barghouti has what it takes for the top job. While Shikaki and others state that Barghouti will certainly play a leading role in a post-Arafat era, it is noted that his high-level leadership skills are largely untried.
Still, those who sing Barghouti's praises stress his corruption-free reputation and his strong nationalist credentials. He was imprisoned by Israel for his Fatah activities at the age of 18, and has spent six years in jail. He was a student leader at Bir Zeit University in the 1980s, was deported to Jordan in 1988 and returned in 1994, under the terms of the Oslo agreement.
On his return, Barghouti completed an MA at Bir Zeit on the history of French-Palestinian relations. He is said to read a lot, and is applying for an external PhD from an Egyptian university. His ordinary village background is seen as another point in his favor. "He has all the necessary ingredients for prominence," says Khatib. "Arafat didn't come from a fancy family either."
In his piece in The Washington Post, Barghouti spelled out what he stands for. "I still seek peaceful coexistence between the equal and independent countries of Israel and Palestine based on full withdrawal from Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and a just resolution to the plight of Palestinian refugees pursuant to UN resolutions," he wrote, concluding, "I do not seek to destroy Israel but only end its occupation of my country."
In setting out his manifesto, Barghouti appears to be clearly distinguishing himself from the political goals of Hamas, with whom he has forged a tactical alliance in coordinating the intifada over the last year. Palestinians believe that under the right circumstances, he will come round to supporting negotiations with Israel again. Indeed, Barghouti, who has engaged in dialogue with Israelis in the past, is acknowledged in many circles as a pragmatist and a realist. Ironically, for a militant leader with an arrest warrant out against him, some Israelis see him as the Palestinian hope.
Whatever transpires, Barghouti will be an important component. He may not be the next leader, Palestinian analysts say, but whoever is will need Barghouti's support. "I think he has very ambitious thoughts," says Khatib, "but not for the immediate future. He probably won't compete for the next vacancy, but perhaps the one after. And if he plays it right, he'll have a chance."
(February 25, 2002)
Palestinian Affairs
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