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What Does Sharon Really Want?
Leslie Susser
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Standing before the Knesset�s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz unfurled maps, pointed to targets, explained goals. It was six days after the assassination of Tourism Minister Rechavam Zeevy, five after the Israel Defense Forces incursion into six Palestinian towns. The operation, said Mofaz, was aimed at searching out terrorist hotbeds, arresting wanted Palestinians, engaging gunmen who opened fire, and preempting suicide bombers. The army would withdraw as soon as its mission was complete, probably in a few days time.
Mofaz added that his troops had been told not to go after official Palestinian security agencies, despite the fact that many of their men play a double role in some of the terrorist groups. Rather, it was to target organizations directly involved in terror � Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, responsible for Zeevy�s murder. The army, he insisted, was not planning to reoccupy West Bank towns or to bring down Yasser Arafat�s Palestinian Authority.
The general�s comments were aimed at legislators. But they were part of a wider effort originating in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon�s office: to convince domestic critics and the far more numerous critics abroad that despite the unprecedented scope of the October incursions, and the reluctance with which Sharon began pulling back at the end of the month, the government genuinely hopes to reach an agreement with Yasser Arafat rather than bring him down at the least convenient moment for the U.S. Yet the pairing of the calming words with the gunfire underlines a basic contradiction in Sharon�s strategy � and leaves plenty of questions about his real long-term goals.
The sheer scale of the incursions has left some in the American administration convinced that more than seeking out terrorists, Israel is out to destroy the PA and to return the IDF to the Palestinian territories for the long term. That, they fear, could set off anti-Israel, anti-U.S. and anti-government protests across the Muslim world from Egypt to Pakistan and undermine the shaky U.S. coalition against Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban.
Speaking for the prime minister, Minister Without Portfolio Tzipi Livni insists Israel harbors no such intentions and argues that one of the reasons the Americans suspect a hidden agenda was the government�s two-part decision on October 17, the night of Zeevy�s murder: �The first part was to move in to tackle the Popular Front and take other military measures. The second part looked to the future and made demands on Arafat, including extradition of Zeevy�s murderers, and it warned that if Arafat didn�t comply, the government would define the PA as �a terrorist-supporting authority.��
The army advanced in line with the first part of the decision, asserts Livni � not because any ultimatum on extradition ran out. Perhaps, she suggests, the Americans misunderstood. They may have thought Israel would stay until the extradition demand was met. And, because that wasn�t going to happen, they may have concluded, incorrectly, that Israel intended to stay indefinitely, regardless of the consequences for America�s coalition against Bin Laden.
On the Israeli left, suspicion of the government�s motives runs deeper. Yossi Sarid of the opposition Meretz party accuses Sharon of looking for excuses to evade a renewed diplomatic process, after Arafat showed signs he was ready to start cracking down on terror groups and return to dialogue. That, argues Sarid, is why Sharon moved into the PA areas within hours of the assassination, not waiting to see whether Arafat would track down the culprits.
Echoed by Palestinians and international opinion-makers, this kind of criticism makes it difficult for Sharon to get the free hand he seeks within his cabinet and from his foreign allies against Palestinian terror. Indeed, it reveals a fundamental internal contradiction in the Sharon government�s announced strategy.
�The policy,� says Ra�anan Gissin, a close Sharon aide, �is to exert coordinated diplomatic and military pressure on Arafat to force him to realize he has no choice but to enter into negotiations.� But the more military pressure Israel exerts, the less international support it gets, and the less diplomatic pressure is exerted on the PA.
Formally defining the PA as �terrorist-supporting� � a declaration favored by right-wing ministers and reportedly by Sharon himself � could have the same mixed results. The cabinet has yet to spell out what steps it would take if it does decide to make that call. Gissin says it would mean Israel treating Arafat�s regime much as President Bush has said he will treat the Taliban: �Either they bring the terrorists to justice or we bring justice to them,� Gissin says, quoting the president. The implication is that Israel would feel no restraint whatsoever about entering Palestinian territory to hunt terrorists and perhaps to assault the Palestinian security forces.
With or without such a declaration, says Gissin, Israel will continue to go in and out of the Palestinian territories, if that is what it takes to protect its citizens � even if Washington censures it. �We would prefer to avoid any argument with the Americans,� he says. �But there is a basic principle at stake here, of self-defense. The American struggle with international terror could go on for years, and we can�t put our right to self-defense in abeyance indefinitely.� On the other hand, if the Palestinians act against terror, Israel will happily stay out, he says.
Indeed, Israeli officials and others in Sharon�s circle believe it is the U.S., not Israel, that has been applying pressure injudiciously. They complain that while Washington censured Israel publicly for moving into the Palestinian territories, its demand that the PA take steps to curb violence was restricted to a private letter from Bush to Arafat.
Says Dore Gold, a former U.N. ambassador to whom the prime minister often turns for foreign policy advice: �I am concerned that Arafat perceives the situation that�s emerging as one in which there�ll be no sanction against him for permitting terror attacks against Israel, while Israel�s freedom of action will be constrained. And that�s a very dangerous perception, because it could push us into an escalatory spiral that would be bad for Israel, bad for the U.S. and bad for its war on terrorism.�
Gold says the Americans have gone about building their anti-terrorism coalition in the wrong way, failing to demand the obvious: that all would-be members pay the price of admission to the so-called �good guys club,� by fighting terror in their own backyards. In the Palestinian case, he says, the demand should have been compliance with the cease-fire proposals worked out by CIA Director George Tenet last June.
Soon after September 11, Livni met U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer to discuss �the price of admission.� Kurtzer, she says, assured her that the Americans would insist that Arafat first curb the violence. She feels they could have demanded much more, and even used Arafat�s need to belong to the pro-U.S. coalition as a lever to reactivate the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process. �There was a window of opportunity,� she declares, �but they sold Arafat his entry ticket too cheaply. Perhaps they could demand more now. It�s not too late.�
As friction between Jerusalem and Washington escalated over the incursion into the Palestinian areas, the government sent a platoon of spokespeople to the U.S. to explain Israel�s position to the administration and the media. One of them was Zalman Shoval, ex-ambassador to the U.S. and also a member of Sharon�s close circle of advisers. The State Department, Shoval told The Report, adjusted its attitude after talks with Israeli envoys: �At the most senior level, it is now adopting the president�s language and saying we should get out �as soon as possible,� rather than �immediately.� And it is no longer saying we should never go in again.�
The change, Shoval says, followed criticism from Congress and elsewhere in the administration of State�s previous approach � which distinguished between Bin Laden and Palestinian terror on the grounds that the Palestinians have a legitimate political agenda.
�Even people who do not share Israel�s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have said that publicly censuring Israel for responding to Palestinian terror is self-defeating. Secretary Powell was severely criticized in the House International Relations Committee � and one of the arguments was that tomorrow the terrorism America is fighting could adopt other forms and advance political agendas, and America could then feel constrained because that would supposedly be a different sort of terrorism.�
Ironically, the escalation in the territories and friction with America came as the region was buzzing with new plans to break the year-old impasse.
Just the night before Zeevy�s assassination, Sharon told a Likud forum of the need for dialogue with the Palestinians, insisted he would head the negotiations himself, and listed his conditions for acceding to a Palestinian state. The day before, British Prime Minister Tony Blair added his voice to Bush�s call for the establishment of a �viable Palestinian state.� Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian parliament Speaker Abu Ala were putting the finishing touches on an agreement for carrying out last May�s Mitchell Committee recommendations: a cease-fire followed by a cooling-off period, confidence-building measures and negotiations that would clearly center on a Palestinian state.
Sharon aides insist the prime minister is totally committed to taking the diplomatic path � if Palestinian violence stops. �If Sharon had been asked to write down what he hoped to achieve during his term, it would have been a long-term agreement with Yasser Arafat,� claims one adviser. �He certainly didn�t want to be a prime minister involved in a long, simmering military conflict with the Palestinians.�
The aides strongly deny that Sharon has any intention of following hard-right Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Lieberman�s prescription for dividing the West Bank into a string of weak cantons. Nor, they repeat, is he interested in toppling Arafat in the hope of being able to deal with a more amenable Palestinian leadership.
All the pressure on Arafat, says Gissin, has one purpose: To stop violence and get the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. �Diplomatic agreements with Arafat,� he argues, �are always achieved by default, when he feels he has no choice.�
But can Sharon offer Arafat a plan he could accept? The prime minister envisions a long, gradual resolution of the conflict. He is now ready to accept a Palestinian state before other final status issues, like Jerusalem, refugees and permanent borders, are addressed. (Indeed, he has pleaded behind the scenes with the Americans to put aside the Jerusalem and refugee issues in any new peace initiative.) But how much independence would the Palestinians have, and on how much land?
Sharon has made it clear that even if a state is established, Israel would retain control of all border entry points, the Jordan Rift, a unified Jerusalem, settlement blocs in the West Bank and an envelope of settlements around Jerusalem. The map he showed Bush at the White House in June was regarded as promising by the Americans � but insufficient. Sharon has not spelled out what he means by making �painful concessions� � whether, for instance, he�d be willing to evacuate any settlements or even stop their growth during the long interim period he imagines.
�The idea is for the Palestinians to have something in hand, so that there won�t be roadblocks anymore and they will have territorial contiguity,� says Gissin. �You can call it a state-minus or autonomy-plus.�
Livni believes that precisely because the plans do not entail a formal end to the conflict, such as that envisaged by Sharon�s predecessor Ehud Barak, they have a chance. �Barak wanted to end the conflict but didn�t have a partner for that. Sharon has been going round with his maps and interim offers to the Palestinians for years. If we manage to get into a process, I believe we�ll be able to reach an agreement. We have a chance here with these two leaders, both of whom are incapable of ending the conflict in one fell swoop.�
But Arafat is dead-set against accepting a mini-state and leaving the other core issues, like Jerusalem, refugees and permanent borders for an unclear resolution in an indefinite future. Meeting with Arafat in mid-October, Blair put the statehood-first idea to Arafat, in coordination with Washington. Arafat�s public response was to call on Israel to rejoin negotiations on all issues � including Jerusalem and refugees.
Still, some Israeli politicians point to signs that the Palestinians, after over a year of violence, are ready to join a new diplomatic effort. �Around the end of August, Arafat realized that the war he initiated against the State of Israel, what he calls the intifada, has failed,� argues the Center Party�s David Magen, the new chairman of the Knesset�s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and an ex-Likud man. �Israel withstood the terror onslaught and maintained national unity, while in the PA there were signs of collapse. If there�s a new window of opportunity now, and Arafat understands that violence gets him nowhere, he may well turn to diplomacy and negotiation.�
Sharon, too, is under pressure from the international community and the moderate Labor wing of his national unity government. But he knows that if he chooses diplomacy, he�ll lose the right wing of his coalition, and provide political ammunition to ex-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is building his comeback campaign. Magen is convinced that, if pushed, Sharon will stick with Labor: �Then he�ll come out with a peace plan and go to elections. Inside the Likud he�d be able to carry something like that, and the more he moves the Likud to the center, the greater his chances of winning an election, even if Netanyahu is strengthened on the right.�
Livni, a Likud moderate, goes further: �Left and right are pass� in Israel. These days Likud and Labor have far more in common than anything that divides them. I don�t think anyone on the left can oppose the fight against terror or that anyone on the right can oppose a reasonable peace deal.�
But pursuing a peace deal could depend on what priority the Bush Administration gives to Mideast diplomacy. Shoval, after his contacts in Washington, says he doesn�t believe the Americans will launch a full-blown initiative. �I don�t think there are any ideas for a definite American plan. It would be unrealistic and create unnecessary tensions.�
Livni says the parties must be allowed to negotiate at their own pace, and warns against the Americans and the international community trying to impose a final settlement. �Either Israel will be backed into a corner and kick or Arafat will... It didn�t work a year ago, and it won�t work now.�
More than offer a blueprint, the Israelis believe, the Americans need to facilitate. But even that is an acknowledgment that Washington holds the cards. The way it plays them in the months ahead could determine whether Israeli soldiers again ride tanks into Palestinian towns, or whether negotiators in suits smile for the cameras and sit down again at the peace table.
(November 19, 2001)
Israel
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