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Hirsh Goodman: 'In-bedding'
Hirsh Goodman
In the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon was criticized for hiding the world�s finest army from its people and the world and for not having documented one of the momentous tank battles in history, the allied routing of the Iraqis in the 1991 battle for Kuwait. This time, mindful of the power of the "new media" and its instant impact on international public opinion, they did a 180-degree turnabout and embedded some 600 journalists from "friendly" countries with U.S. and British forces, down to the battalion level. They also made sure these journalists had the technical means to communicate with their editors back home when the field commanders deemed it was safe for them to do so without endangering their men, and report on the situation in keeping with the rigid censorship requirements of field security.
The thinking behind the embedding process was creative: First it was recognized that in this day and age, with micro-satellite cameras and other advanced broadcast technologies, you cannot hide a story; at best you can try and control it. This is achieved by making the press people partners to the story, and by placing them in an environment where the conditions under which they are reporting the story are strictly controlled.
Reporters, all of whom signed a draconian release form before being embedded, gave up almost all journalistic freedom. The military tells them when they can report, on what they can report, what they cannot report, and it can pull the plug on any reporter who does not comply. The embedded reporter is entirely dependent on the goodwill of the unit he or she is with, the same soldiers they break bread with, whose safety they pray for, whom they befriend and have empathy for -- making control of the story highly emotional as well as physical, and, therefore, good for how the military wants the story to be spun.
Over 200 news outlets in all forms, TV, radio, print, e-mail, web, have embedded representatives. They have had the allies capture Basra and then not capture it, reported a civil revolt in the town that wasn�t, found a chemical plant near Najaf that also wasn�t. Najaf, like the port of Um Qasr was also captured, lost, then captured again. The fragmentation of the reporting greatly contributed to the confusion. We may be seeing great TV, but we aren�t getting the story.
The danger of not being embedded is either being captured by the Americans and held as spies (as were two Israeli and two Portuguese journalists recently; see page 56), or exposed to possible death. To date seven journalists have been killed in this conflict, three of them inadvertently killed by British forces in an identification foul-up, and four more have been reported missing. And the problem with being embedded is that you end up "in-bedded" -- in other words, in bed with the military, a pawn rather than a journalist, serving the military�s needs rather than reporting on them and confusing the public rather than informing it. The reporting, being patchy and piecemeal, has confused the analysts, many of them embarrassed by last night�s mistakes and finding themselves desperately having to rearrange the little toy men, tanks, jeeps, ships, planes and arrows on plastic illuminated maps of Iraq, to conform with the current situation "as best we see it."
This is the most reported war in history. The Arabs have three satellite stations of their own, their reporters embedded with the Iraqis, with a pistol, literally, pointing at their heads. Since the Iraqis like to control the story as well, the net result is that the "streets" in Arab capitals have become inflamed, as pictures of the damage and the casualties inflicted by
allied bombardments are endlessly played on screens in the Arab and Muslim world, causing genuine outrage at the suffering of the Iraqi people whom the Americans claim to be liberating. Even the footage from the embedded friendly reporters, particularly of how Iraqi suspects are being treated at roadblocks (sound familiar?), and the human suffering and massive destruction evident as the tanks roll on and the guns blast away, is beginning to paint an ugly picture, certainly not the one Pentagon media planners had in mind when they came up with the idea of embedding.
The Americans, who are behind the planning of this war�s media policy, thought that by fragmenting reportage and controlling it through embedding and limiting broad media access to controlled press conferences, they would be able to control the image and the narrative of this war. To a degree they have succeeded, but the images are becoming nasty and the narrative confused and lacking in credibility. There is a great benefit to fighting a war under the fog of battle, not allowing your enemy to know your moves and creating an illusion of strength even if it is not there. But on the other hand, the public also has the right to clear, honest and credible information over what the war is about, how the war is going and what to expect.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld does not provide that picture at his briefings -- this is largely his war and he is, therefore, defensive about it. The military brass, even Gen. Franks, the top commander, is careful not to cross swords with the politicians. The British, though more articulate, are just as controlled in the information they are giving out. And, as a result, though this is the most reported war in the history of war, never, it seems, have we known less about what is actually happening.
Is the confusion part of a massive, well-organized, brilliant deception plan designed to baffle the enemy, or does it really reflect unbelievable incompetence? Could the allies really have failed to take into account that they would have long vulnerable lines of supply? That the Iraqis fighting on their homeland, not in Kuwait, would put up serious battle? That guerrilla tactics and suicide bombers would not be used? That is what the embedded reporters and close-mouthed officials briefing the press lead us to believe. If those major miscalculations are indeed the case, it seems that the Pentagon should have spent less time planning to control the media and more understanding the enemy.
April 21, 2003
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