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Ehud Ya'ari: Itďż˝s Over
Ehud Ya'ari

The Palestinian leaders recognize that the violent enterprise has failed

The Intifada is over. After a year of slowly withering away, consumed in the flames of murderous terrorist attacks, itďż˝s dead, and the Palestinians of all varieties have finally given it a burial. The road map is the epitaph on the tombstone. Behind the smoke screen of Palestinian "conditions" that come along with the cease-fire, the leadership on the other side has recognized, however reluctantly, that the violent enterprise has failed.

They will, of course, continue to pay lip service to the "resistance" and its feats for some time to come, but behind closed doors, they are already talking explicitly and harshly about the terrible mistake Yasser Arafat and his colleagues made, about the need for explanations and about the need to settle accounts with the instigators of terror, when the time comes.

On our side itďż˝s legitimate to criticize Chief of Staff Moshe Yaďż˝alon for daring to tell the truth: that this is "a victory of sorts" for Israel. There are moments when it is better to keep quiet than to tell it the way it is. But his was nevertheless a correct assessment of the latest drama. What happened, after all? One by one, the Palestinian factions declared that "military operations" are no longer in the national interest, that the attacks are no longer expressions of patriotism but the opposite: sabotage and even "terrorism" in the words of Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). And even if the Hamas and Is-lamic Jihad version speaks of a mora-torium of three months only at this stage, there is no argument that this process is essentially one of retreat with no surrender.

This doesnďż˝t mean that the attacks will immediately, totally end. From now on, though, they will be considered as "violations" of the cease-fire -- exceptions deserving of punishment and condemnation. And it goes without saying that all along the way, the truce will proceed in the shadow of constant threats of a resumption of terror and continual complaints that Israel is not strictly fulfilling all the demands made on it, including the release of prisoners. In other words, this is a cease-fire that is both armed and feeble.

Actually, this is a two-layered cease-fire. The first is between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, in the form of renewed security arrangements in Gaza and Bethlehem. The second is between the PA and Hamas and its fellow travelers, and is based on an agreement to suspend attacks without resolving the dispute regarding the "road map." Gradually, the PA is regaining responsibility over Area A, the territories it fully controlled under Oslo. Hamas has gained immunity from Israeli assassinations. And Israel gets some quiet.

In order to progress from this point, it must be acknowledged by all that the death of the intifada is due first and foremost to the aggressive, uncompromising policy of the army and the Shin Bet security service. Without campaigns like Operation Defensive Shield and Determined Path, and the threat of repeating them in the Gaza Strip; without the policy of targeted killings, with all the problematic aspects involved; without the waves of arrests, the closures and the encirclement of the cities, the Palestinians would not have laid down their weapons. And even this is nothing more than engaging the safety catches, bullets still in the chamber. Had Israel not taken this line, Arafat and his cronies would have stuck to their guns. That was their plan in the first place, and they will yet try to breathe life into this dreadful vision down the road.

A similarly decisive policy is now required to stabilize the cease-fire and to develop it into a new agreement that will replace once and for all the blueprint of the Oslo Accords. Determination is demanded both in terms of Israeli gestures and concessions, and insistence on strict fulfillment of obligations on the Palestinian side in the first, security phase of the road map.

We now must strive to change the environment on the ground and strengthen the clear majority of almost 80 percent of the Palestinian population that now supports the cease-fire. We will also have to take risks in dismantling roadblocks, lifting closures, releasing prisoners who have not been directly involved in terror acts, and resuscitating the moribund economy in the impoverished territories. A change in the armyďż˝s open-fire regulations is essential. So is a readiness to enter into a dialogue about the "wire curtain," the fence that is lazily going up all the while. The fence, or wall, is supposed to be a security measure -- an obstacle for the suicide bombers -- and not a prelude to political-territorial separation. In the light of the cease-fire it would therefore be worth reconsidering both its route and the pace of construction. The threat of the unilateral construction of the wall greatly helped the Palestinians come to their decision. The fence achieved its purpose even before it was built, and itďż˝s perhaps better that way.

In addition, Israel must single-mindedly insist that the PA deal with the Hamas apparatus and put the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades into retirement. They must also change their public rhetoric. Not just silence incitement in the PA media, but systematically revise the implicit messages. It must be stressed that the road map is a "performance-based" document, and that must be related to with appropriate awe. Every deviation, every failure will be turned into an issue. Limits have to be placed on the consideration given and concessions made to Abu Mazenďż˝s difficulties, otherwise there will be no end.

The new Palestinian government should be embraced, of course. But with strong arms. Arafat must not be allowed to creep back to center stage. Hamas must not be allowed to become a hidden partner of the PA. The weapons must not be stored away but confiscated. And every violation should be responded to immediately by Israel.

Only this way, with an ongoing, seemingly narrow-minded effort on Israelďż˝s part, will the cease-fire represent a turning point, and not just a time-out.