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Ehud Ya'ari: The Baghdad Effect
Ehud Ya'ari

Asad�s fiery speeches condemning any settlement with Israel have suddenly been forgotten

Yes, believe it or not, Bashar Al-Asad is craving for talks with Ariel Sharon. And not only that: Syria�s young president suggests opening negotiations without the Americans -- basically, behind their backs -- and only later tempting President Bush to lend a hand.

Moreover, Asad is no longer conditioning a deal with Israel on Israel�s reaching a prior settlement with the Palestinians. On the contrary, his spokespeople explain that the "road map" for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is not a satisfactory document, but that nevertheless, Damascus is ready to move forward. Nor, apparently, is Asad even insisting that the negotiations start from exactly the point at which they broke off, opposite Ehud Barak at Shepherds-town in 2000.

Asad is talking about a phased negotiation, with Syria and Lebanon sitting at the table together, in a united front, facing Israel. But those who have been meeting with Asad�s envoys get the impression that it may be possible to talk about Lebanon first. Since Syria has turned the Lebanon-Israel border, with Hizballah deployed there, into an extension of its own front, we may as well start talking to them exactly about that.

All this falls under one heading: the Baghdad Effect. The collapse of the Iraqi Ba�ath regime, which was shameful in Arab eyes, is stirring the Syrian Ba�ath Party to strive for innovations, without bothering to explain why the official positions of only yesterday no longer apply. Damascus�s red lines were crossed in Baghdad, and what was considered treif is now certified kosher.

Actually, the Syrians put out their first feelers to Sharon even before the war in Iraq started. It was a kind of market research into the price of insurance policies. Of course they didn�t expect Sharon to snap up the bargain. They just wanted to register the fact that they hadn�t waited until after the battle shock. OK, noted. Now what?

Any thinking person will understand why Asad�s fiery speeches condemning any settlement with Israel have suddenly been forgotten, along with the lectures he gave -- to the embarrassment of his aides -- to other Arab heads of states, and his arrogant statements wishing the Americans trouble in Iraq. From the moment that he was told by the United States to halt the activities of the Palestinian terror organizations operating in his territory; to disarm Hizballah; to take his army out of Lebanon; to stop arming his Scud missiles with chemical warheads; to hand over all of Saddam�s henchmen who took refuge in Syria and to desist from any subversive activity in Iraq -- from that very moment, Asad�s easiest escape route was via entering into negotiations with Israel. Then he can tell the White House that most of the demands being made on him are being dealt with as part of a diplomatic process and will be resolved by agreement, and not as the result of massive pressure.

Simply put, instead of giving answers to Colin Powell -- or, God forbid, to Donald Rumsfeld -- Bashar al-Asad is ready to undergo Sharon�s fire test. But not necessarily in order to achieve results. The mere fact of the process is meant to remedy his ills.

So is it worth Israel�s while to "go for it"? There are those who will say -- justifiably -- that the present regime in Damascus is not worthy of being helped. As a strategic principle, the argument goes, we are better off without Asad than with him, and therefore, it is preferable to leave him up against the Americans, and wait.

Then there are those who will say just the opposite: that Syria is currently in the pits, and perhaps Israel could obtain a settlement on improved terms? I doubt it. In any case, should we be giving the Golan Heights back to a regime that is well on its way to total bankruptcy? Should we seal a fateful deal with a ruler who has lost his credibility, even in the eyes of his own subjects?

Israel�s strategic interest still lies in removing Syria from the arena of war before the decisive round of negotiations with the Palestinians. So if Syria wants to talk -- it�s welcome. But just like in the case of Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), performance should come first.

In other words, instead of throwing a lifeline to a drowning man, let�s see concrete steps from Syria toward neutralizing Hizballah on the Israel-Lebanon border and removing the long-range rockets from Lebanon, as well as an explicit commitment to urge Hamas & Co. to stop their war of terror.

Let the Syrian president do himself the honor of proving that his intentions are serious. Let him fulfill the main part of the demands that he heard from Powell. Let him part ways with Hizballah�s Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas�s Khaled Mash�al. Let him sit his envoys down opposite the representatives of Sharon. And then let them talk about Lebanon first.