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Ehud Ya'ari: Where Have All the Flowers Gone?
Ehud Ya'ari

There is no longer any best-case scenario for this war; that illusion is already behind us

This war got off to a bad start. The diplomatic groundwork was, to put it mildly, catastrophic. The negotiations with France, and particularly Turkey, ended in disappointment, leaving the United States and Britain to go to war without the Security Council�s stamp of approval and without the ability to open a true "northern front." As a result, the generals have had to adopt a war plan that is inferior to the original one and to try to implement it with a smaller array of forces than required.

Moreover, the promises of the exiled Iraqi opposition heads, swallowed whole by some Americans, about spontaneous civilian uprisings against Saddam and mass desertions from the Iraqi army -- or at least the non-participation of the regular forces -- all these had proven false by the first week. The expected big bang of "Shock �n� Awe" didn�t materialize and Saddam�s regime didn�t crack, but absorbed the opening blows.

As these lines are being written, on the 11th day of the war, the main question is whether the Pentagon will manage to improvise a new war plan -- improvisation never having been one of its strong points -- in the heat of battle. The media, of course, will snipe at Rumsfeld and his people; in the Arab capitals, there will be those whose knees will be knocking in fear at the lack of a swift outcome; many are expecting the Americans to fall into a quagmire. But it is best to arm oneself with patience and avoid hastily translating the conclusions of the opening phase of the war in the run-up to the decisive phase.

The primary point is that the Iraqi regular army with its five multi-divisional corps chose not to fold in the first round. That is, units that came under attack on the southern front -- such as the 51st and 11th divisions -- put up a reasonable fight without being too stubborn. No white flags, and no "jihad." What the Americans had been hoping for next was to isolate the rest of Saddam�s regular forces without getting into a fight with them. The 4th Corps was a candidate to be cut off and surrounded in its positions east of the Tigris, and the 1st Corps started withdrawing in the Kirkuk district from the moment the American 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into Harir, in the Kurdish zone.

Secondly, militias like the "Fadayun of Saddam" and the "Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Army" have become an important factor on the battlefield, given that part of their men are prepared to fight against the American rear echelons, even when surrounded, as in Nasiriya, or against the British in Basra. The diversion of the coalition�s efforts into cleansing and mop-up operations of the areas that have been captured will be time-consuming and will not, in and of themselves, bring about the desired outcome. In the absence of any large city willing to surrender and receive the GIs with rice and flowers, Baghdad has to remain the main focus.

Thirdly, in order to achieve a decisive victory in the Baghdad arena, the Americans will have to move more forces -- and essentially tanks -- to face the defense formations of the Republican Guard divisions. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force had, by the end of March, taken up position opposite the bridges over the Tigris in Kut and Al-Nuamaniya without enough armor for a massive water crossing. The U.S. 5th Corps to the west, had -- luckily -- captured most of the bridges across the Euphrates, but without enough momentum to immediately exploit the success. In conclusion, reinforcements are essential, caution should come at the expense of speed and the coalition should not operate according to a stopwatch.

Breaking the six divisions of the Republican Guard around the suburbs of Baghdad will probably not spell the end of the battle because of the hordes of militiamen inside the city, in addition to the members of the "Special Security" and a division of the "Special Republican Guard." The siege of Baghdad will be the moment when Saddam may well start acting as Arafat did in Beirut in 1982. In other words, that will be the moment for him to test the possibility of closing a last-minute deal. If he comes to the conclusion that he has no chance of saving his own skin, he may then act according to Samson�s wish, "Let me die with the Philistines." And that will be a very dangerous juncture, for Israel too.

Another danger: An "Iraqi intifada" -- that�s how it�s being referred to -- could break out with Iranian and Syrian influence, as a rebellion against both Saddam and the United States at the same time. That is, the Shi�ite population, for the main part, could organize to destroy the remnants of the Saddam regime whilst obtaining legitimacy by means of resisting any American administration in Iraq. It is possible that a situation has already been created in which it would not be advisable for the United States to encourage any Shi�ite uprising at all. In any case, Ahmed Chalabi and his like in the pro-Western Iraqi opposition won�t be the ones leading the rebellion.

True, there is no longer any best-case scenario for this war. That illusion is already behind us. All that is left is to hope for a realistic, down-to-earth scenario that strives for a complete victory, even if it comes at the price of losing time and giving up on popular Iraqi participation.