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David Horovitz: The Travails of a Rejected Politician

How frustrating it must have been these past three years to be Yossi Beilin. He knew, just knew, that if only the government in which he served under prime minister Ehud Barak had been more conciliatory in its dealings with Yasser Arafat, a permanent peace accord was there for the signing. Thousands of lives would have been saved. And rather than grappling with terrorism, a crumbled economy and international disdain, we�d all be living in harmony. He knew this with absolute certainty -- the same absolute certainty, incidentally, with which Barak concluded that further conciliation would endanger Israel�s very existence.

Ever since that peace accord was snatched tragically from his grasp, in the Beilin conception by Barak�s recalcitrance, the former justice minister must have nursed the most acute sense of grievance. He must have been consumed by the desire to reach again for that missed opportunity -- to demonstrate to grieving Israelis and hostile Palestinians that there is "someone to talk to" on the other side.

But he must have known as well that his credibility was negligible. Most Israelis loathe Yasser Arafat for sanctioning terrorism in the 1990s and encouraging the killers after that. And many Israelis detest Beilin with comparable passion, as architect of the rehabilitation of Mr. Million Martyrs. As misconceived as Beilin may have considered such personal opprobrium, there can have been no denying it, especially when his own Labor party excluded him from its Knesset slate for

January�s elections, when Meretz, to whom he then defected, also placed him out of the parliamentary running, and when both parties, paying the ballot-box price for having partnered Arafat, were largely rejected by the electorate.

The pity of it: To be so sure, on the one hand, that he could make peace and, on the other, that his countryfolk didn�t trust him to do so.

Precisely because he had such marginal public standing, Beilin must have recognized that to now formulate with like-minded Palestinians a general proclamation of principles for peace -- along the lines of the "People�s Voice" citizens� petition being promoted by ex-Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon and Al-Quds University president Sari Nusseibeh -- would not be enough to persuade the masses that peace could yet be attained. And so he set about negotiating a full-scale "model" for a permanent agreement, complete with multiple clauses, annexes and maps. No longer an elected politician acting on prime ministerial instructions, he nonetheless determined to complete the deal he had been denied at Taba in January 2001.

He had no support from a mainstream Israeli party. But he did enjoy official British involvement, via Lord Michael Levy, Middle East fixer for Prime Minister Tony Blair, for whom a breakthrough would constitute a blessed relief amid the waves of "why did we go to war with Iraq?" domestic criticism. The good lord�s son is Beilin�s longtime aide.

And Beilin succeeded. The Geneva Accord, soon to be dropped through every Israeli mailbox for our deliberation, presumably represents the terms of the agreement he could have reached, had Barak been supportive, at Taba.

He has been hysterically condemned by some politicians on the right, and harshly criticized by quite a few too, from his former Labor home. But the astonishing degree of interest this "theoretical" deal has attracted from Israelis underlines how profound is the vacuum it attempts to fill -- the black hole where proactive government diplomatic policy ought to be.

And yet, while many Israelis are desperately seeking diplomacy, central elements of the Geneva Accord are unacceptable to a significant majority. Beilin�s Palestinian counterparts were no less resolute than at Taba. Now, as back then, they insisted on a 100-percent Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank, and that any West Bank territory annexed by Israel to encompass settlements be traded for an equivalent chunk of Israel to come under Palestinian rule. Beilin agreed. Now, as then, they demanded full Palestinian sovereignty at the Temple Mount, and through much of the Old City. Beilin agreed. A careful reading does indicate a dramatic breakthrough on the refugee issue, although some Palestinian negotiators now claim it does not supersede the demand for a "right of return" for 4 million Palestinians to Israel. The assertion that the Palestinians explicitly recognize Israel�s right to exist as a Jewish state is not fully borne out in the text.

This accord, in sum, may be no better for Israel, and might well be worse, than the principles presented by President Clinton in his final months in office. The Clinton principles, moreover, underpin the "road map," which is endorsed not only by Israel and its key ally, the U.S., but by those anti-Semitism-tolerating French and the rest of Europe, the U.N., and, crucially, the Palestinian Authority. Beilin�s accord, by contrast, is anything but official; indeed the PA, like the Sharon government, has distanced itself from it. In his quest for a peace formula, it therefore appears Beilin has made concessions most of his countryfolk oppose without even winning the binding consent of our adversaries. And that, one can only imagine, will actually make it harder for any subsequent government to reach a better, or even comparable agreement. If and when we all meet again at the peace table, the official Palestinian leadership will be reluctant to settle for less than the Geneva terms, and may well attempt to obtain more. Beilin, in short, may have achieved the opposite of his ambition, and rendered the prospects for a mutually acceptable deal more remote, not more realistic.

The dogged Beilin will be vindicated should the imminent Geneva PR campaign, combined with events on the ground, ultimately resurrect the majority he needs to return to office and implement his accord. If not, he will earnestly lament Israelis� shortsightedness in spurning what he considers these best-possible terms. But, of course, that�s democracy for you: the people entrusting the key decisions over their future to the politicians in whom they have the most confidence. Even if, to the would-be leaders whom the voters choose to reject, some such decisions constitute tragic national misjudgments.