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Ehud Ya'ari: An Offer in Disguise

A thorough examination of Prime Minister Sharon�s Herzliyah speech leads to one significant conclusion: Sharon is ready to remove settlements -- not just illegal outposts -- as an early step in the context of implementing the road map. He didn�t say so in quite those words, but he came close enough to a declaration that he is prepared to undertake actions in Phase One of the road map -- the phase dedicated to fighting terror -- which, according to the text, he is only obliged to carry out in Phase Two, the phase that deals with the "Palestinian state in provisional borders."

Sharon�s unilateral "disengagement plan" -- to be implemented if and when the road map is deemed to have collapsed -- is likely to remain no more than a vision for at least the next six months. In the meantime, a fundamental change has taken place in the attitude of the "Father of the Settlements." It was Sharon who planned the Jewish communities on the West Bank ridge, in the heavily populated areas of Samaria and in the Hebron Hills, and it is he who now suggests, albeit with a cautious wink across the Atlantic, that some of them should be removed forthwith.

This is an opening for a deal. Notwithstanding the instinctive grumbling with which the Palestinian leadership greeted Sharon�s speech, a few of them are perfectly capable of reading its hidden message. The prime minister�s threat -- and his bait -- will therefore undoubtedly serve as a catalyst for negotiations with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), for what they�re worth.

On the table are the following general parameters: A Palestinian effort (that will require the active help of Yasser Arafat) to stop terror, in return for the removal of the illegal outposts and a reduction in pressure from army raids, targeted killings, closures and checkpoints. With this comes a prior understanding that progress toward a firm cease-fire will lead to a limited redeployment in the territories, including the removal of a few established settlements.

In other words, we are speaking of a cease-fire developing into an armistice agreement with a territorial aspect -- the giving up of land and settlements; a political aspect -- entering into negotiations for a "provisional state"; and an international aspect -- an apparatus for monitoring the implementation of the arrangements. I have already pointed on these pages to the model of the Rhodes armistice agreements of 1949 as the only reasonable way out of the conflict. A cease-fire alone will not hold up, as proven by last summer�s hudna. A permanent settlement along the lines of the unofficial Geneva initiative is unattainable for now and

seeking one would be a waste of precious time. Only an armistice with real political depth will perhaps -- and I stress, perhaps -- survive.

The conditions are far from optimal. For Sharon, it would mean kissing Arafat through a veil. Abu Ala is completely dependent and devoid of power: He didn�t want to send Fatah people to Geneva to sign with Yossi Beilin, Arafat forced him, then hopped over to join the demonstrations against them. Neither did Abu Ala want to travel to Cairo for cease-fire talks with Hamas, knowing they would fail. But again, Arafat forced him to. The PA has, as one of its senior officials said recently in private, long since turned into nothing but a pay office that distributes salaries.

Hamas is flexing its muscles with demonstrations and shows of arms. Fatah is fragmented into rival factions. The head of military intelligence, Musa Arafat, the Chairman�s cousin, is financing the weapons-smuggling tunnels in Rafiah. And Jibril Rajub, who as the former head of the West Bank Preventive Security was so careful not to get involved in terror, is now, on Arafat�s behalf, funding the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. In short, it�s total chaos.

But it is essential to make a serious effort to prevent a PA implosion. There is no logic in Sharon saying that the Palestinians must fight terror according to the road map and in return see the unauthorized outposts taken down, but if they don�t play ball Israel will dismantle whole settlements as a unilateral act. Why would the Palestinians put a security plan into operation when they have been promised that without one, settlements will be evacuated? For them, fighting terror would be worthwhile only if the evacuation was the prize promised from the outset. And for Israel, if Sharon is in any case thinking of evacuating Ganim and Kadim, near Jenin, or Netzarim and Kfar Darom in the midst of Gaza, what would be the point of doing so unilaterally, as the conflict persists? Surely it would be preferable to do so as part of a shortcut toward ending the confrontation.

Sharon knows that he cannot implement the "disengagement plan" in the way that his aides are leaking it to selected members of the press. If it means, as they say, dissecting the West Bank into four or five Palestinian mini-enclaves -- with a fence penetrating from the west and the Jordan Valley fenced off to the east -- then Israel will find itself like the Jew in the folk tale who both ate pork and got kicked out of town. It will be impossible to obtain international endorsement for such a configuration, and it could cost us the support of good friends. If the Sharon aides are leaking his "plans" in order to threaten the Palestinians with them or to try and protect his right flank on the domestic political front, that�s all well and good. But if he really intends to carry them out, we�re in trouble.

In any case, it will always be preferable to draw the lines for an armistice (read: an interim agreement or "provisional" Palestinian state) by agreement and not as a unilateral diktat. And if we get to the stage of unilateralism, then the withdrawal has to brush the 1967 lines in order to gain legitimacy. Even Ehud Olmert learned that from another Ehud -- Barak.

And finally, there�s the regret over missed opportunity. Just imagine if Sharon had offered what lies between the lines of his Herzliyah speech to Abu Mazen a few months ago. Imagine if he had allowed President Bush to initiate a cease-fire deal, including the evacuation of settlements. Bush would have been so grateful to Sharon, and so appreciated the gesture, instead of grouching about him. And Abu Mazen would have appeared in Ramallah as someone who had achieved things Arafat never could. If Sharon had offered Abu Mazen�s security chief Muhammad Dahlan back then even half of what he will lay out before Abu Ala, things would be looking very different now.