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Ehud Ya'ari: Dreams across the River

The �Jordanian option� is no longer a dirty phrase in the Palestinian lexicon

In closed forums, central figures from the Palestinian leadership have lately started talking about the need for Jordan to resume an active, substantive role in the West Bank. Sixteen years after the late King Hussein was forced to declare his kingdom�s disengagement from its former possessions across the river amid the wrath of the first intifada, there are whispers about the need to find a new formula establishing some kind of linkage between efforts to create an independent Palestinian state and the neighbor to the east. It is still too early to say whether these stirrings reflect a twist of despair at the ongoing implosion in the territories, or whether they result from some serious rethinking.

What�s interesting is that thoughts along these lines are being expressed not only by outspoken opponents of Yasser Arafat, but also by some Fatah leaders who are very close to him at the present time. Without mentioning names, for obvious reasons, suffice it so say that these are not insignificant people. The voices are coming from Nablus, with its long pro-Hashemite tradition; from Hebron, which has deep ties to Amman; from the salons of the Ramallah elite and from certain Fatah heads in the diaspora. While nobody is speaking too loudly about it, it is being discussed freely.

The basic idea goes something like this: Egypt will become involved in the Gaza Strip by providing advisers and trainers for the security forces, by "accompanying" the process of rehabilitating the local administration and offering a protective umbrella to the leadership that will take control there after Israel�s withdrawal. The Egyptians aren�t too keen on this, but feel that they have no choice. Then the Gaza example will constitute a precedent and a stamp of approval for Jordan to do the same in the West Bank.

In the case of the West Bank, it might even be possible to send over the Palestinian battalion that is still attached to the Jordanian army, and even to recruit another such battalion. Both sides would explicitly declare in advance the vision of some sort of formal linkage between the Palestinian state-to-be and Jordan, to be put to a public referendum in the territories. Essentially, this is about extending Jordan�s security and administrative apparatus to the West Bank via the existing Palestinian apparatuses, which would undergo a process of refurbishment and regeneration at the same time.

From the Jordanian leadership�s perspective this is a very problematic plan. There are in any case 3.2 million Palestinians in Jordan, making them a majority of the total population of 5.5 million and more than the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza put together. TheTrans-Jordanian establishment constantly strives to minimize the Palestinians� role in the political life of the kingdom while strictly honoring their civil rights, especially in the economic sphere. There are no longer any Palestinians in senior government positions, as there used to be. The new election law of 2001 saw to it that there are only 18 members of parliament of Palestinian origin in the 108-seat house. Moreover, Jordan harbors deep suspicion toward Arafat and his entourage, as reflected in King Abdullah�s May 18 interview with The New York Times. Even after the royal court issued a clarification stating the king had not suggested that Arafat abdicate, the effect of the original words (about Arafat looking in the mirror about his future) remains clear: Abdullah is advising Arafat to resign. So why would the Trans-Jordanians want to take upon themselves such a thankless task?

The answer of those Jordanian and Palestinian personalities with whom I spoke is simple: Jordan is entirely dependent on the United States and if it is called upon, it will respond. There is, after all, wide support for the vision of some form of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation among the Palestinian population in the kingdom and even in certain circles of the Trans-Jordanian elite, including the Muslim Brotherhood. The prospect of huge sums of money flowing in, both in the form of future compensation for the Palestinian refugees and generous support for the rehabilitation of the West Bank, is too tempting to ignore. Other potential advantages include the granting of Palestinian citizenship in the new state to those Palestinians of Jordan who do not have citizenship there and will thus acquire resident status, thus reducing the tensions between them and the country in which they live.

For now, this is all in the realm of daydreams. None of these things are actually about to happen, at least not in the foreseeable future. The important thing is not how realistic a program this is, but the fact that it is percolating down by itself into the internal Palestinian debate.

It is another sign of the growing inner doubts about the worth of a small independent state; further acknowledgment that the Palestinians in the territories will have a hard time getting back on their feet by themselves; and a strengthening of the recognition that the Palestinian problem in its full dimensions will be difficult to resolve within the geographic and demographic confines of the "occupied territories."

There are also other factors such as the Palestinian envy of Jordan, which Arafat tried to seize in 1970. The Palestinians covet the kingdom�s steady growth, its authoritative, yet tolerant and open regime, the safe atmosphere that prevails on the clean streets and above all, a leadership that managed to shed its conflict with Israel.

The "Jordanian option" is no longer a dirty phrase in the Palestinian lexicon, even if it has been completely obliterated from the Hebrew political dictionary.