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Ehud Ya'ari: Handle with Care

Every incident in Gaza could fuel a crisis between Cairo and Jerusalem

Prime Minister Sharon is feverishly seeking an agreement with the Egyptians for cooperation in realizing his Gaza Strip withdrawal plan. On top of the understandings already reached with President Bush, the beleaguered politician is now trying to develop a partnership with President Mubarak.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this idea, so long as Israel proceeds with great caution. Dragging a reluctant Egypt into the boiling cauldron of the intifada is no light matter, and it brings with it as many risks as chances of success.

The zeal of certain individuals in the Prime Minister�s Office to entice the Egyptians into returning to Gaza arouses fears of a serious flaw in their understanding of the fragile structure of peace between the two countries. To hitch this bilateral relationship to the Palestinian issue is a radical departure from the form of coexistence molded since the Sadat-Begin era of the late 1970s.

A quick reminder: Egypt went for peace with Israel precisely to cut itself free of its bondage to the Palestinian problem. First there was an attempt to come to an agreement with Israel over self-rule in the territories, but in 1982 Mubarak discarded that fig leaf too. Ever since, Cairo has stuck to a systematic, consistent policy of disengagement from any direct involvement in the Palestinian issue. This, in turn, has allowed the peace treaty to withstand such traumas as the Sharon-inspired war against the PLO in Lebanon and the pre- and post-Oslo intifadas.

The Egyptian decision to disengage was reflected, for example, in the intentional decimation of the pro-Egyptian lobby among the Gaza Palestinians, in the obstacles faced by students from the Strip who wanted to study in Egyptian universities, in the refusal to export Gaza oranges via Sinai and Port Said on the Suez Canal and so on. Egypt simply washed its hands of the Strip and made sure there were no cracks in the barricade it erected between them.

Of course, the Egyptians never abandoned their pro-Palestinian posture in the diplomatic and propaganda spheres, their support for Palestinian actions and their stinging criticism of Israeli behavior. However, they stringently compartmentalized these issues in a drawer apart from the cold but stable peace they have maintained with Israel over all these years. In fact, this peace has survived only because it was always sifted clean of the Palestinian context.

Moreover, the Egyptian leadership has long since come to the somewhat ironic conclusion that removing itself from any active role -- let alone one of patronage -- vis-�-vis the Palestinians eases Cairo�s relations with the other Arab states. Throwing away the autonomy plan in the early 1980s paved the way for the cancellation of the pan-Arab boycott of Egypt which had been in force since the Camp David accords of 1978.

In short, Egypt feels comfortable and safe when it keeps its distance from the Palestinian headache. The Egyptians are more relaxed when they are cheering or jeering at Gaza from across the Sinai�s dunes.

Now they are interested in helping quiet down the intifada. That�s why they responded to Sharon�s requests to agree to send some 200-300 advisers and trainers to assist the Palestinian security forces in the Strip. They are also prepared to replace the police currently guarding their side of the Philadelphi Route along the Gaza-Egypt border with more effective units, to cut the flow of smuggled arms into Palestinian territory. And after failing in their attempts to lobby Yasser Arafat to halt the terror, they are apparently ready to function as baby-sitters, coordinating steps that will curtail Arafat�s authorities and putting acceptable figures such as Muhammad Dahlan in charge of the Strip. The Egyptians have also presented Arafat with lists of officers to be fired from their jobs and they are acting as facilitators between the Muqata�ah and Sharon among other things on the idea of moving Arafat from Ramallah to Gaza.

At this stage, it is not at all clear whether Egypt will follow through with this change in approach. Arafat, for one, is not at all enthusiastic and is sending out his aides to attack Mubarak for having "surrendered" to Sharon. Nevertheless, the picture that seems to be emerging is for some kind of Egyptian "sponsorship" over the Palestinian administration in Gaza. Even if Mubarak refuses to take upon himself full responsibility, Egypt will be a directly involved party.

If this plan proceeds smoothly, with no serious complications, it will represent an important Egyptian contribution to pacification, as well as to fundamental change within the Palestinian Authority and its relations with Israel. But the working assumption must be more pessimistic. The Egyptians could find themselves entangled in the coil of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. Every incident in the Strip could fuel a crisis between Cairo and Jerusalem. The measure of success in stopping the intifada will become the barometer of the peace between the two countries, and the Palestinians will wield an influence they don�t have today over the game of competitive containment between Israel and Egypt.

Therefore, there must be clear understandings from the outset between Mubarak and Sharon on the scope of Egyptian intervention and, essentially, the amount of grace Israel is willing to extend when it comes to examining progress. Israel has no interest in having Egypt bogged down in the Gazan dunghill. If the Egyptians can be helpful, fine. But if they become helpless, it�s a recipe for disaster. Most important is the preservation of what has been achieved so far: the insulation of the Land of the Nile from the troubles of the Holy Land.