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Ehud Ya'ari: The Hamas-Jihad Axis

The Palestinian Islamic terror organizations are changing both pace and direction. This could very well be the moment heralding a turning point for the worse in the internal Palestinian power struggle, and these are the signs:

� For the first time since the founders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad split off from their mother movement, the Gazan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the 1980s, they and the leaders of Hamas, another contemporary incarnation of the Brotherhood, have clinched a far-reaching deal on close cooperation. They are even talking about the possibility of merging their military wings, Hamas�s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Battalions and Islamic Jihad�s Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Brigades.

� The summary of the agreement speaks of coordination toward the establishment of an alternative "parallel regime" in the Gaza Strip and presenting the new alliance as a counterweight to what remains of the Palestinian Authority and its apparatuses. That is, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not only dictating a continuation of the intifada, but are also positioning themselves as a potential ruling power. They are picking a fight with the PA while, at this stage, not making any move to physically supplant it, instead suggesting a kind of Gaza-style cohabitation in which the PA is no longer the exclusive authority.

These are not just empty words. The agreement was reached with the active mediation of the heads of Hizballah and with the encouragement of Iran. It was sealed at a half-secret meeting in Beirut of members of the exiled leadership of the two movements, headed by Hamas�s Khaled Mash�al and Ramadan Abdallah Shallah of Jihad. They chose, naturally, not to hold a press conference and to avoid photo-ops, and they didn�t publish the text of their agreement. All they produced was a short leaflet, stating the decision to carry out joint operations. And indeed, immediately afterwards, there was a sharp up-turn in the curve of attacks throughout the Gaza Strip. In one, an October 24 infiltration into the settlement of Netzarim, three Israeli soldiers (including two women) were killed.

It is worth remembering that the rivalry between Hamas and Islamic Jihad has historically been one of the most volatile fault lines in the Palestinian arena. Perhaps surprisingly, the pro-Iranian Jihad was always considered closer to the mainstream Fatah and, as a small organization, more subject to its influence. But since the intifada began, the ideological differences between Jihad and Hamas have been blurred. Hamas, like Jihad, has been swept under the Iranian umbrella, even though for years Hamas�s spiritual mentor Sheikh Ahmed Yassin has strongly opposed the ideological-political doctrine of Khomeini and his heirs, objecting to the principle of the supremacy of the jurisprudent, or in other words, entrusting government to the clerics. The traditional Muslim Brotherhood position has always been to strive to make governments stick to Islamic tenets, but not to seek to supercede the politicians themselves.

Hamas�s traditional opposition to the armed struggle has also long since disappeared. Abandoned in 1988, it has been replaced with a seemingly insatiable desire for terror. So the path has been paved for the cooperation that the two organizations are now trying to establish, and the wheels will be oiled with Iranian cash.

The very existence of this association represents an utter failure for Fatah, which until recently mockingly dismissed the Islamic Jihad as a force, viewing it as a less-worthy opponent that could be taken for granted. The combining of Jihad�s contacts and operational infrastructure with the much broader Hamas apparatus will upgrade both groups� operative capabilities against the Israeli Army and even more so, strengthen their hand in the power struggle in the Palestinian street. In the very first days following the "Beirut Agreement," the two organizations set out to demonstrate their hegemony in various points of the Gaza Strip, mainly by holding marches to mark their joint attacks, but also by erecting checkpoints and carrying out armed patrols.

And so it is that just when the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad have gone underground, fearing ending up at the wrong end of an Israeli missile, their public profiles have risen. Ironically, Israel�s targeted killing of their operatives, like the terror attacks they produce, has put wind in their sails compared with the complete lethargy and impotence of the Palestinian Authority.

It�s true that in many respects the Gaza Strip is still "Fatahland," an area in which Fatah has clear supremacy. Only now that axiom is being put to the test, and signs of erosion are beginning to appear.

The structural relationship that could develop in Gaza between the PA and the Islamists could soon come to resemble that of Hizballah and the Lebanese government, in which Hizballah maintains only a pretense of subordination to the state. And that would be an absolutely terrible model from Israel�s point of view.