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Ehud Ya'ari: The Eastern Border


The settler lobby is dragging far behind events, perhaps because its leaders haven�t grasped that Sharon is changing the rules of the game

Over the past few days I have had the opportunity to speak with most of the central players involved in the warm-up game ahead of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza about a year from now. My interlocutors have included King Abdullah in Jordan, Egypt�s President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, chiefs of the Palestinian security apparatuses and some key figures from the American side. I have also heard from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the army top brass.

Here are my conclusions:

� Israel�s principal efforts are directed toward obtaining an agreement with the United States, and on the back of that, if possible, with at least some of the Europeans, on the establishment of a "provisional" eastern border for the State of Israel. The aim is to draw up a route for the security fence between pre-67 Israel and the West Bank that is acceptable to Washington, as a basis for a cease-fire or an interim arrangement with the Palestinians, whether it is arrived at by agreement, in coordination or in conflict with the other side. The evacuation of the Gaza Strip is, in fact, only a complimentary, symbolic step toward this principal effort.

� In determining the eastern border -- and on this point, by the way, Sharon is careful not to talk too much -- Israel starts out from the assumption that if the Clinton parameters of December 2000 spoke of a withdrawal from 96-97 percent of the West Bank in the context of a final peace settlement, then in the framework of the coming interim phase, Israel will be able to hang on to much more. The fence will envelop all of east Jerusalem and keep the main settlement blocs "approved" by Clinton (such as Gush Etzion, Givat Ze�ev and Ma�aleh Adumim) on the Israeli side. Most of the settlements will remain in the heart of the Palestinian territory, including Ariel, without a fence pending a final settlement. The IDF will operate on both sides of the fence.

� Because the far right won�t agree to much of this, such steps require a new government in Jerusalem. Shimon Peres is prepared to try to bring the Labor party into the coalition. Shas too is signaling its readiness, so long as Shinui can come up with a reasonable explanation for sitting at the same table. And Histadrut secretary general Amir Peretz�s One Nation party will complete the switch. Sharon cannot under any circumstances rely on the support of all the Likud Knesset members for his plan, therefore he absolutely has to line up all three of these factions to replace the National Religious Party and Yisrael Beitenu at the cabinet table.

� There is no chance at the moment that the Palestinian Authority will be willing or able to come to an agreement with Israel over this next phase. Former security strongman Muhammad Dahlan, who some have pinned hopes on to become the lord of the Gaza Strip, has gone off to England "to improve his English at Cambridge." The security plan prepared by British MI6 staff is limping into existence and their efforts to bring about cooperation between the rival security apparatuses in the Strip have failed completely. Yasser Arafat is in no hurry to take any decisions whatsoever, and the internal polarization within his Fatah organization is getting worse. To say there is "no partner" is more true today than before Sharon unveiled his initiative.

� Egypt is not prepared to stick its hand into the fire. Cairo will agree to station two battalions of Border Police, instead of its civil police force, on the Egyptian side of the Gaza-Sinai boundary, but not to send forces into the Strip. This may help Israel decide to give up the Philadelphi route along that border. At heart, the Egyptians would prefer Sharon to wait rather than produce a fait accompli. One cannot exaggerate the level of Egyptian anxiety about anarchy in the Strip after Israel�s withdrawal, or the fear of a Hamas takeover there and the kind of fall-out that such a scenario could radiate across the border.

� The Jordanians are waiting for the Egyptians. They fear that any collapse of the Palestinian Authority would instigate Palestinian migration across the Jordan River. They do not entertain the thought -- at least for now -- of intervening in the West Bank, though there are some in Amman who believe that it will yet come to that. The Jordanians are therefore pushing for a declaration at the upcoming Arab summit in late March that will "go beyond the Saudi initiative" of March 2002. The problem is that the Saudis are not in the right mood and the Syrians oppose any such move.

� In the face of Palestinian impotence, Egyptian reluctance, Jordanian anxiety and Israeli determination, the Bush Administration finds itself in the run-up to the U.S. elections in a position it didn�t want to be in: as the arbiter of the outline of a non-agreed-upon arrangement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The Americans would have preferred to evade playing this role, but it is too late now. From the moment they reach some kind of a deal with Sharon, they will be the ones on the front line.

� The settler lobby -- perhaps the strongest pressure group Israel has ever known -- is dragging far behind events, either because its leaders haven�t grasped exactly what is motivating Sharon, who is changing the rules of the game, or because they have failed to understand the favorable reactions to his initiative in Israel. The amount of opposition they�ve managed to produce so far is surprisingly lightweight.

And the bottom line: There is likely to be a large gap between Sharon�s disengagement plan as first announced and what it looks like in the end. Too many actors are deeply discomforted by the dilemma he has placed them in, even if they are calling this a "historic juncture."

April 5, 2004

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