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Ehud Ya'ari: Itďż˝s Either with Him -- or without Him

The extended effort to bring about the political castration of Yasser Arafat has ended in failure. From now on, itďż˝s going to be either with Arafat as the principal puller of strings on the Palestinian side, or without him. There doesnďż˝t appear to be anybody in sight who could constitute an alternative Palestinian address, bypass the chairman, push him aside or, in the face of his outright opposition, implement policies that challenge his own.

The Israeli cabinetďż˝s public decision calling in principle for the "removal" of Arafat -- almost coinciding to the day with the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accord -- is as superfluous as the announcement of the policy of making him irrelevant was before it. And there is no longer any hope that the Palestinians will take on the task themselves.

The cabinet declaration delivered a deportation order to Arafat with one hand, and with the other it gave him a certificate of insurance against it being used. As was only to be expected -- and was already clear as day to Prime Minister Sharon as he rushed back from India for the meeting -- the declaration rebounded in a wave of protests and warnings against turning the intention to exile Arafat into reality. Without missing a beat, Arafat himself surfed quickly back onto center stage, this time under the auspices of Secretary of State Colin Powell, to bellow out his familiar chant about "millions of martyrs marching to Jerusalem."

The episode of the Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) government, however heart-warming it was to those sitting in the White House, was doomed to failure from the outset. Arafat had been waiting in ambush for the right moment to move from the defensive to the counterattack. And within a few days, he completely put paid to all the stories doing the rounds in the halls of diplomacy about Abu Mazenďż˝s determination to see his policies through and his chances of survival. It was no wonder that even after Abu Mazenďż˝s resignation, American representatives relayed reports from here to Washington that there were still good chances of an immediate comeback.

If Abu Ala forms a government in the end, he intends, according to what he himself says, to treat Arafat in an entirely different manner. A government with Abu Ala as prime minister will not set itself up as an alternative source of authority to the Muqataďż˝ah and wonďż˝t propose a different political strategy, as Abu Mazen and his internal security minister Muhammad Dahlan did.

Rather, it will serve as an implementing arm that will gently try to coax Arafat into accepting its advice. Instead of cornering him, it will prostrate itself before him.

So the attempt to collapse the Arafat-terror doctrine as an instrument of achieving independence without peace, without getting rid of the man himself, has reached its sad conclusion. Now Arafat presents Sharon with the following choice: either accept him, Arafat, as the architect of a new cease-fire and as the future beneficiary of a Pal-estinian state within "temporary borders," according to Phase Two of the Road Map; or slide into a chaotic spin of violence that will preclude any agreed solution at all. In other words, Arafat is asking Israel to reconcile itself with the notion of "runaway statehood" -- independence without a final peace treaty -- or take the risk that the Palestinians, with or without him at their helm, will embark on an approach best described as running away from statehood, indefinitely extending the current state of civil war.

Both these options are, of course, terrible for Israel, and both must be avoided. Which leaves a simple question or two: Should we leave Arafat to get on with rebuilding the strength he lost -- to a large degree, willingly -- during the intifada, or should he be declared a wanted man? Should he be offered a final chance to leave the Muqataďż˝ah safely for exile abroad, knowing that by staying he runs the risk of an attack on his headquarters?

The decision the Israeli cabinet took on September 11 should have been taken a year ago. And the decisions that, at the current pace, will be taken a few months from now should be taken tomorrow.