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Ehud Ya'ari: ï¿½Gated Communityï¿½

The Gaza population will still be pinned within a tight Israeli grip

As of this moment, there is no "disengagement plan" for the Gaza Strip. There is a plan for withdrawal, both from the Jewish settlements and from army facilities. But the way it is to happen means that the Strip, with its 1.2 million residents, will be one big fenced-off prison camp, very much engaged with Israel, which will hold the keys to all its gates. For now, Israel will retain control of the "Pink Line" -- the Philadelphi Route on army maps -- that runs along the Stripï¿½s border with Egypt; Israel will run the border crossing into Egypt at Rafah; Israel will insist that the small airport at Dahaniya remains shut down, and Israelï¿½s naval blockade of the Gaza coast will continue.

It all adds up to the Strip remaining dependent on Israel for the movement of goods and labor and for the supply of fuel, electricity and cement, and everything else. Gaza will become a grotesque caricature of a "gated community," the very opposite of the security, freedom and affluence conveyed by that phrase.

The occupation of parts of the Gaza Strip will come to an end only in that there will no longer be a permanent military or civilian presence on the ground. But the Palestinian population will still be pinned within a tight Israeli grip. And since Gaza, as we know, is not capable of surviving on its own resources, responsibility for what happens there will rest, at least partially, on Israelï¿½s shoulders. The proposed closure of the Erez industrial zone, which sits on the Palestinian side of the Gaza-Israel crossing point and provides a living for 7,000 families in Gaza, will only exacerbate the hardship. For the joint industrial zone to continue operating without being considered as a remnant of the "occupation," and thus serving as a justification for continued "resistance," will require prior agreement with the Palestinian Authority or at least with the international community.

Until the current circumstances change, the actual meaning of Sharonï¿½s plan is a redrawing of the deployment lines amid ongoing violent confrontation. The army will be relieved of the burden of protecting 17 Jewish settlements in an area densely populated by Palestinians. Israeli forces will redeploy along the security fence around the Strip, and will continue to carry out incursions and raids inside the Strip when necessary. The war against the smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Route will heat up, with the armyï¿½s defense capacity significantly reduced, as it is bound to be when it finds itself stuck in posts along this narrow lane, with all movement along its only road exposed to fire.

Moreover, with Netzarim and the settlement bloc of Gush Katif gone, the Palestinians are likely to transfer the bulk of their terror activity to an artillery campaign aimed at Israeli border communities such as the city of Sderot. They are already busily planning for this, manufacturing improvised mortars and Qasam rockets. Further down the line they may obtain rockets that would put Ashkelon within range too.

Israel wants to believe that it has scored important points -- though of course not a full victory -- in the battle to shape its border with the West Bank. The settlement blocs marked for annexation when the time comes are to be on the Israeli side of the security fence, which President Bush now describes as a "barrier," and no longer as a "wall snaking" deep into Palestinian territory. The section of the fence known as the "Jerusalem envelope" will cut off the eastern part of the city from the Palestinian hinterland in the West Bank. The army will carry on protecting the settlements beyond the fence as it has done until now.

This is the trade-off Sharon is hoping for: Gush Katif will be sacrificed for the sake of Gush Etzion and its other West Bank counterparts.

Beyond these facts, the rest is a guessing game revolving around two basic scenarios: One is that the Palestinian Authority will fashion a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip on the basis of some kind of "partnership" with Hamas, and the international community engaging in an effort at economic rehabilitation coupled with hands-on "babysitting" of the program to reform the security apparatuses. The counter-scenario supposes the widening and deepening of the chaos prevalent in Gaza, with terror constantly bubbling away in the cauldron. In the first case Hamas will carry on operating in parallel with the PA, whereas in the second, Hamas will establish itself as the dominant force. Nobody -- not Yasser Arafat nor Gaza Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan -- intends to confront Hamas at this stage.

The dialogue that Dahlan had begun with Abd al-Aziz Rantisi (the two grew up next door to each other in the Khan Yunis refugee camp) will carry on with whoever succeeds the recently departed head of Hamas in Gaza. There is a serious chance, although no certainty, that the dialogue will end in success. The outline of the agreement will, however, be drawn by Arafat from the Muqataï¿½ah, and he has no desire at all to see the withdrawal from Gaza mark the end of his intifada. So long as the whisperings about an elegant court coup within the PA donï¿½t materialize into action to push the rais off his pedestal, it will also be impossible to operate in Gaza against his wishes. The assessments that the Palestinian commanders in the Strip are worrying about their own affairs without taking the bossï¿½s demands into account have no real basis.

The Palestinians see the planned evacuation of the Gaza Strip as a victory, as the realization of the undeclared goal of the intifada -- the acquisition of territory and a sort of sovereignty in the absence of an agreement and concessions to Israel. Yet in the higher echelons of Fatah there is real fear that this may be a tactical victory that paves the way for a strategic defeat. And buried within the fear lies a chance that the more this feeling takes root, the more the urge will grow to finally go for the elusive confrontation against Arafat.