The Jerusalem Report Magazine: Columnists : Columnists Article

Click for Contents

Click here to subscribe to The Jerusalem Report

P.O. Box 1805,Jerusalem 91017
Tel. 972-2-531-5440,
Fax: 972-2-537-9489
Advertising Fax:
972-2-531-5425,
Email Editorial: [email protected]
Subscriptions: [email protected]
Web site: http://www.jrep.com

Ehud Ya'ari: Yes Now, Buts Later
Ehud Ya'ari

The price demanded from Israel in return for an end to the intifada is not particularly high in the opening stage

The price demanded from Israel in return for an end to the intifada is not particularly high in the opening stage

THE "ROAD MAP" IS FAR FROM A PERFECT PLAN. European pens worked elements into it that have the potential to distort the original "Bush vision" of a different Palestinian leadership. The sequencing is not ideal, with performance benchmarks left quite ambiguous. There is too much emphasis on international conferencing and too little insistence on the necessity of negotiations -- and reaching agreement -- between the two sides. Essentially, the danger that lies in this document is that a Palestinian state may be established (albeit in "provisional borders"), without prior agreement with Israel, without a firm commitment to peace but only with some kind of cease-fire.

But even fair criticism of the road map (there is, of course, plenty of unfair criticism of it too) should not blur the fact that in the final analysis, this is a rather comfortable plan for Israel in many respects.

Therefore Israel�s goal should not be to get the map shelved along the way, but to correct some of the flaws inherent in it. For example, Israel should try to reach an understanding with the Quartet -- the U.S., European, Russian and U.N. sponsors of the plan -- that a Palestinian state, should we get to that stage, will only be established on the basis of a prior agreement regarding the refugees� "right of return." The same goes for Israeli demands to limit this state�s sovereignty and for the dismantling of the terror organizations, rather than having them folded into the security services of the Palestinian Authority.

Israel should not present preconditions, but should strive for an additional memorandum to accompany the road map once the process reaches the stage of implementation on the ground. Despite American assurances that Israel�s reservations would be taken into serious account, which allowed the Sharon government to endorse the plan, we are still far away from that. An understanding with the Quartet that Israel will require clarifications along the way ought to be Sharon�s diplomatic goal, though he need not necessarily put it in the public spotlight yet.

After all, is the American administration likely to put up a determined fight for the refugees� "right of return"? Is this the intention of the British, or the Germans? Or even of the Russians? I doubt it very much. By the same token, is the Quartet committed to the known Arafatist ideal of "runaway statehood" free from any of the restraints of peace? Only a moonstruck paranoid would believe these days that such an evil conspiracy was lurking in the creases of the road map.

That being the case, it would be better for Israel to try to come to an agreement with Washington, London and Moscow -- and if possible, with Paris too -- that only after the completion of the first, security stage of the road map and the pacification of the intifada should the political aspect be discussed with the Palestinians.

There is not much Israel can lose by adopting such an approach. If the road map has the power -- which I seriously doubt -- to serve as an exit mechanism from the cycle of violence, there is no reason now to start writing its epitaph. And if, as Hamas has promised, there is only one road map -- that which leads the suicide bombers to Paradise -- then the document will in any case turn into a collection of dead letters.

Sharon�s position will be all the stronger for declaring that he is prepared to proceed toward a two-state settlement so long as the end goal is a Palestinian state that rises in peace, by agreement, and for peace, by accepting arrangements that ensure its demilitarization and root out the other latent threats it presents to Israel.

The price demanded from us in return for an end to the intifada is not particularly high in the opening stage: a settlement freeze, the removal of the illegal outposts and other steps that in any case would be taken with the waning of violence, to ease the hardship of the Palestinian population. The construction of the separation fence can meanwhile go ahead, as can the battle to finish off the political strength of Yasser Arafat and to smash the terror networks that have spread through the territories in the past two and a half years.

The bottom line: It is worth Israel�s while to demand a future payment for its acceptance of the road map, rather than an immediate reward. In stockmarket speak, it�s time to purchase options on the peace index.