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Ehud Ya'ari: Iraq First
Ehud Ya'ari

Arafat thinks that anotherGulf War will lead to an international conference

The Israeli-Palestinian arena is now dominated by Iraq. All calculations are subordinated to the expectation of war. The timetable of our ongoing conflict is based on the assumption that sometime between the end of Ramadan (the first week of December) and the return to work after the Christmas holidays (the first week of January), the Americans will strike their blow.

Neither the Israeli leadership nor the Arab political establishment have any serious doubts as to the ability of President Bush to achieve a swift military victory. And even those who don�t think the outcome will be so clean, predicting huge problems the morning after the war, share in the assessment that the routing of Saddam Hussein in itself will have a wide-ranging impact on the region as a whole, our area included.

Abu Mazen, the perennial favorite candidate for bringing about something akin to a putsch against Arafat, has suggested using this time in the run-up to the war to take decisive action. His blueprint outlines a three-month partial cooling-off period for the intifada, during which the IDF would leave the Palestinian cities and the Palestinian Authority security forces would set about disarming the militias. This would be followed by the implementation of reforms in the PA and a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations. In other words, Abu Mazen wants to significantly reduce the intensity of the violence ahead of the war with Iraq.

Except that Abu Mazen, despite the majority he enjoys in the Fatah Central Committee and within the ranks of the Palestinian command, has so far been unable to deliver Yasser Arafat himself to back such a deal. In any case, it is doubtful that Prime Minister Sharon could agree to a withdrawal and a policy of restraint while the efforts to carry out terror attacks and dispatch suicide bombers are guaranteed to go on. So that formula, it seems, is doomed to remain a non-paper.

As an alternative, Abu Mazen and a few of his colleagues have thought up a "Gaza First" approach with a new twist. The idea is to mobilize the Tanzim and the Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, and first and foremost against the Popular Resistance Committees, which have become a prime force in the south of the strip.

The October 7 murder of the commander of the Gaza anti-riot police, Gen. Rajeh Abu Lehiya, in a revenge attack by members of the Aql family, who are strongly identified with Hamas, could have provided the PA with an excuse for such a crackdown. That would have allowed the PA to demonstrate that there is a real partner for dialogue on the Palestinian side, and to go into the war on Iraq with the Gaza Strip producing significantly less volume of terrorism and rocket attacks than at present.

Again, though, despite the many harsh words spoken against Hamas and despite a plethora of threats and muscle-flexing by armed Fatah militiamen in the streets, the leadership didn�t take any real action at all.

The Gaza Strip remains tense at the time of writing, but Fatah has made do with demonstrating its superiority in the area without forcing a showdown. Fatah clearly recognizes that if the PA does not rein in Hamas, Israel, at the end of the day, will have no choice but to carry out a thorough clean-up in the Gaza Strip, similar to the one under way in the West Bank. It is just as clear that the moment the Palestinian lathes manage to produce rockets with ranges long enough to threaten, say, Ashkelon, the IDF will in any case have no choice.

The upshot is that so long as Abu Mazen and his like avoid engaging Arafat or Hamas in a real test of strength, and make do with grumbling, threats and position papers, there won�t be any serious change in the situation and all the attempts at de-escalation will be overtaken by the war in Iraq (or whatever last minute formula is found to replace it).

Shimon Peres is recommending to Sharon that he should immediately announce his support for the Quartet�s settlement plan that adds quite a few provisions to President Bush�s June 24 outline. He argues that after the war, the plans on offer may well be much less considerate of Israeli interests, and that the pressure will be on. Sharon thinks otherwise. He believes that even after the war in Iraq, the U.S. administration still won�t give priority to an initiative on the Palestinian front. The United States will be too busy building up the new regime in Baghdad and likewise, in the rest of the Arab states. According to Sharon�s version, Arafat will be pushed into a corner, and what�s left of the intifada�s momentum will shrink even further.

Across the fence, a similar debate is under way. Arafat thinks that another Gulf War will lead to an international conference � la Madrid. He is hoping to hold on until then. His rivals in the Fatah leadership, however, argue that that is a dangerous gamble, and that Sharon will exploit the coming period to hasten the implosion of the Palestinian Authority.