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The Sands Are Shifting
Ehud Ya'ari

A Palestinian escalation may force Sharon to react with a step that Israel wanted to avoid

THE CLOCK IS TICKING VERY FAST. THERE IS A RACE between the rapidly decreasing life expectancy of Ariel Sharon�s prime ministership, now that Avigdor Lieberman & Co. are out of the government, and the renewed momentum being gained by Yasser Arafat.

Secure in the belief that Sharon will keep his public promises not to harm him personally, the chairman is now determined to end the career of his greatest foe. And we -- Israelis and Palestinians alike -- are condemned for now to a continuation of the bloodbath, even if American envoy Anthony Zinni manages to announce a process toward a cease-fire that at best will provide a mechanism to control the prolongation of hostilities.

In my assessment, we have entered the last phase before the decisive finish. The Israeli Army is close to exhausting its potential for exerting pressure, after the invasion of Ramallah and the string of mop-up operations in refugee camps and other towns. Only the aces remain up Israel�s sleeve: a general call-up of the reserves, a temporary takeover of most of the cities of the West Bank, or perhaps finally toppling the Palestinian Authority, which means getting rid of Arafat and his inner circle. In any case, there aren�t too many Palestinian security forces HQs still standing, and the PA�s civil institutions are half-paralyzed.

The other side, in contrast, has the ability to increase, even significantly, the volume of terror, either by openly integrating regular PA units into the conflict or by widening the range of targets and upgrading the nature of the attacks. Incidentally, they are now mulling over these options out loud.

The only conclusion one can draw from this state of affairs is that a Palestinian escalation may force Sharon -- with or without Labor in the coalition -- to react with a step that Israel had wanted to avoid.

A way out of this cruel dilemma could conceivably lie in some kind of formula for a cease-fire, or, at least, for a significant reduction in the level of carnage. Sharon was three months too late in grabbing on to the coattails of the Tenet understandings for implementing a cease-fire, even though the Tenet document is most accommodating to Israel. Acting earlier would have allowed the rational wing in the Palestinian camp to exert a degree of calm.

Now the environment has changed: The Palestinian narrative is blurring our narrative about the reasons for the war and its goals, depicting it as a war for "their homes" as opposed to our homes. And Arafat will now try to dodge the Tenet understandings if only he can, and insist on a tangible political price in return for a nominal cease-fire. The sands have shifted into a new configuration. With Zinni, both the Israeli and Palestinian parties are talking about a process of reducing the violence in the course of negotiation, and not about immediate quiet. All this comes in the shadow of a change in the Americans� tone and open criticism from the White House about Sharon�s handling of the campaign.

The first months of 2002 have represented a very important turning point: Fatah, with its thousands of armed men, has effectively become the main enemy. It is no longer Hamas and the like that present the immediate threat. Moreover, the PA intelligence and security agencies find themselves continually retreating in the face of the Fatah Tanzim militia, to the point that even colonels Jibril Rajub and Muhammad Dahlan, the powerful Preventive Security apparatus chiefs, are now dancing to the tune of Marwan Barghouti, the most prominent spokesman of the militant line.

Israel failed to break Arafat and his prot�g�s in the Tanzim with its latest military operations, necessary and effective as they were. On the other side, meanwhile, there is a feeling that the terrorism is working and they should do more of the same.

Another important factor is that Israel is now inside a triangle, with each side constituting a different front: the Palestinian front that is burning; the Lebanese front that is being warmed up by Hizballah; and the Iraqi front that the United States is cooking up. Needless to say, a situation in which three or even two fronts are simultaneously active is undesirable. In these circumstances, putting out the fire on the first front becomes ever more urgent.

If Israel delays, Iran could instruct Hizballah�s Hassan Nasrallah to skip to more serious provocations on Israel�s northern border, going beyond Hizballah�s firing of anti-aircraft cannons with 57-mm shells that aren�t really designed to hit the Israeli planes flying at 50,000 feet, but to scatter the pieces of casing on the heads of the residents of the Galilee; and beyond the shooting incidents that have started up across the border fence and the occasional infiltration like the one in early March, in which six Israelis were killed.

The same with Iraq. Saddam plans a blow against Israel if attacked -- that is already entirely clear -- but we have no interest in delaying what the Americans have in store for him. A nuclear Iraq would be Israel�s worst horror scenario.

Which brings us back to where we started: the ticking clock. We cannot lose time. Procrastination will only make things worse. There is an urgent need to choke off the cycle of violence here, whether by agreement or by a final showdown. Either way, the cost is obviously going to be high.