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Ehud Ya'ari: Back for a While

It would be a good thing if, together with the military moves, an Israeli statement of intent were issued

The Israerli Defense Forces are back where they did not want to be: the streets and alleys of Nablus, the Jenin refugee camp, and Tul Karm. There was simply no alternative. The almost desperate effort to strangle terrorism had to shift from the defensive strategy that followed Operation Defensive Shield in April back to deep penetration of what has once more become enemy territory.

But great care must now be taken not to allow this temporary seizure of territory to become a reoccupation. The destruction of the production lines of the terror machine must be a purely military matter, without Israel being dragged into reestablishing the military government or the Defense Ministry�s Civil Administration that controlled the daily life of the Palestinian population for more than a quarter of a century, with total inefficiency and absolute lack of ability.

The IDF must by no means become a substitute for the abortive Palestinian Authority�s rule. Indeed, everything should be done to preserve the administrative arms of the various PA ministries and to operate through them, and not by bypassing them. The educational system should remain in their hands, even if the IDF has to decide when school starts again. And this is true of all areas of life, including police operations, to the extent that this is possible.

It is of key importance that Israel makes it clear in everything it does that it has no intention of liquidating the PA, but only to act toward changing its leadership and its policy. In practice, this means that in the next few weeks, there will be dual government in the West Bank, with the IDF and the PA operating in tandem. This won�t be a happy, willing marriage, but a necessity, and, what�s more, an investment in the future. There will of course be innumerable difficulties and friction that result from this cohabitation, between the Israeli officers and the Palestinians in all the localities. But to emphasize that this is not a permanent occupation but a temporary sojourn, and that there is no intention of doing away with the PA, but to reform it, is valuable in itself.

First of all, because, if things reach the pass where Yasser Arafat is expelled -- a dramatic step that I am doubtful can or should be avoided -- it is most important that it should not be interpreted as the end of the PA experiment, but as the prelude to an opportunity to rehabilitate it as a peaceful partner, rather than a violent and hostile neighbor. It would be an error to expel Arafat alone; a substantial group of his partners in terror must be sent away with him at the right time, to some point on the Sudanese coast. We shall yet witness how all the Arab rulers will do everything they can to get rid of this hot potato.

Arafat is aware of the danger. This is why -- Good Morning Yasser! -- he is now pretending that he agrees with the Clinton parameters of December 2000, and allowing some of his associates to sign petitions against attacks on civilians in Israel -- without, incidentally, explicitly condemning suicide terror, and without opposing armed struggle within the occupied territories. And this is why he keeps coming up with more and more "reforms." All this is too late -- the train has left the station.

It would be a good thing if, together with the military moves, an Israeli statement of intent were issued. It is doubtful that Ariel Sharon wishes or is capable of taking such a step at this time, but here is an idea for him: Israel will declare that it is ready, the moment terrorism dies down, to go back to the gates of Camp David with the new Palestinian leadership, on the understanding that the Israeli team will bring two dossiers. One: Our narrative as to the reasons for the failure and the details of the negotiations during the term of Ehud Barak -- from Stockholm, through Camp David, to Taba. Two: The package of unavoidable conclusions to be drawn from the two years of the terrorist offensive that ensued.

Which is to say that Israel would be ready to enter a discussion with the Palestinians over the reasons for the demise of the Oslo Accords and the disappearance of the vision of a permanent solution. At the same time, Israel would make it clear that what was offered then is no longer available, in view of our experiences in the interim.

This formula, suitably polished up and sharpened, could serve to support the current Operation Determined Path, in that it would signal the political intention behind the military campaign. It would bolster the necessary avoidance of reoccupation, and at the same time give cover to what must be done.