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Ehud Ya'ari: Step It up

There is no alternative, Israel has to step up the pressure on the Palestinians, unrelentingly and uncompromisingly. This isn�t the season for polite courtship and exercises in dialogue. This is the time to do more of everything that Israel has been doing up till now, more adroitly, more determinedly and with no letup until we attain our goal, which can be defined primarily as getting Fatah, at least, to pull out from the terror campaign.

There are cracks in the Palestinian camp. The majority of the public still bays for revenge against the Jews, yet is even more interested in finding an exit from the intifada. A choking feeling of defeat and loss of direction pervades the ranks. The people no longer feel wind in the sails pushing them forward. In short, there is a silent acknowledgment of having made a terrible mistake.

Arafat, it must be said, still thinks otherwise. He urges his supporters in the half-destroyed rooms of the Muqata�ah, his Ramallah HQ, to show patience, to think in terms of a long-term confrontation that has its ups, but also its downs. He doesn�t want the intifada he sparked to end in failure, without showing any tangible result.

Hence, even though the top echelon of Fatah, including almost all of Arafat�s closest associates, wish they could change the pattern of the confrontation, they don�t have the power to impose their view on the ra�is, or on the armed gangs who have gone underground all over the West Bank. They would be happy to see the suicide bombings end, and efforts focus on paramilitary raids against soldiers and settlers over the 1967 Green Line alone. But unless Arafat and his handful of henchmen are recruited to the cause, there will be no such change in direction.

The situation is that those who can today be defined as the minority -- the militiamen of the Fatah Tanzim�s "Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades," along with the leadership of Hamas and the three rejectionist factions -- are now openly coming out against any attempt to impose discipline on them. Armed Tanzim operatives have gone so far as to explicitly threaten the political echelon of Fatah, and Hamas is openly provoking what�s left of the Palestinian Authority.

The armed militias� position is simple: Since there is no real gain to be had from stopping the wheels of the intifada with the Palestinians in such a deflated state, the only option is to strive to create as quickly as possible some kind of "balance of terror" vis-�-vis Israel. Hamas, for example, is trying to deter Israel from assassinating its commanders by promising to kill 100 Israelis for every one of its dead leaders. With Iranian inspiration, Hamas is working hectically to produce improvised "Qassam 3" rockets with a 10-kilometer range that would threaten cities in the Israeli heartland such as Ashkelon and Kfar Saba.

On this basis, the expectation must be for continuing escalation, but of a kind that will take place within an increasingly bitter internal debate on the Palestinian side. The suicide bombings still raise a cheer, but they are no longer at the heart of the popular consensus. The Palestinian public doesn�t understand where Arafat and his men are trying to take it anymore, or what it is exactly that they are trying to achieve. People are grumbling that instead of progressing toward independence, things have deteriorated in the other direction.

That�s why it is so critical to keep up Israeli pressure right now, not only by hunting down the remnants of the terror networks in the West Bank, demolishing the houses and exiling the relatives of the suicide bombers, but beyond that too.

First of all, the policy of weakening Arafat and encouraging the "political entrepreneurs" around him requires firmer supervision of his isolation in Ramallah. If we don�t want to see him as a player, then why allow his cabinet ministers and members of the PLO Executive Council to travel to him overland from Gaza? The answer should be "Sorry, Israel doesn�t consider that meetings led by him justify special travel permits."

Moreover, Israel should declare as targets those people involved in terrorism who now shelter under Arafat�s umbrella in his compound. There should be demands for their surrender along with warnings that they may be hit, and wherever possible, they should be captured. The fate of Palestinian intelligence chiefs such as Tawfiq Tirawi and Mahmud Dimra, for example, should become a matter of public debate.

And if Arafat wants to discuss things with his errand boy Saeb Erekat, he will have to keep the Tirawis and Dimras at bay. He cannot have it both ways.

As for Hamas, Israel should adopt the principle that movement heads who educate toward suicide bombing and preach in praise of such actions should be added to the wanted list, whether they are direct practitioners of terror or only incite toward it. And other people had better be careful not to find themselves in their midst. God forbid if any impression was given following the assassination of Salah Shehadeh that Israel has recoiled from its policy of targeted killing. On the contrary, we must keep pressing.

The European Union and the United States should be brought on board to demand that the Fatah leadership dismantles its partnership with Hamas and their allies. If Arafat claims that he isn�t able to prevent the attacks, OK. But the least he could trouble himself to do would be to take Fatah out of the joint committees that were formed with Hamas to coordinate activities in every district.

The transfer of funds from Israel to the PA should depend not only on that side�s transparency and accountability, but also on the PA�s distancing itself from all the arrangements it has with Hamas.

The logic behind the next stage of Israel�s war on terror must be a concentration of efforts on those elements in Fatah who have come to the conclusion that a change of direction would be for the better, but who still don�t dare to carry through. And pressure must be applied on the two central forces that are preventing Fatah from moving ahead: on the one hand, Arafat; and on the other, Hamas.