The Jerusalem Report Magazine: Columnists : Columnists Article

Click for Contents

Click here to subscribe to The Jerusalem Report

P.O. Box 1805,Jerusalem 91017
Tel. 972-2-531-5440,
Fax: 972-2-537-9489
Advertising Fax:
972-2-531-5425,
Email Editorial: [email protected]
Subscriptions: [email protected]
Web site: http://www.jrep.com

Arafat Is Arafat
Ehud Ya'ari

THE ISRAELI SEA COMMANDOS� SEIZURE OF THE weapons-loaded "Karine A" shows, if nothing else, that Yasser Arafat, while publicly declaring a cease-fire, is clearly preparing for the next round of fighting. The huge amounts of weapons found aboard the ship bound for the Palestinian Authority could only have been intended for a future round -- Arafat understands that he has lost this round, and is now trying to cut his losses.

When Arafat is planning on entering that next round is not known. He probably doesn�t have any definite timetable himself. But he certainly wants to be ready for whenever the opportunity arises.

The Palestinian Authority has been and is engaged in ongoing efforts to smuggle in arms, mostly through the border with Sinai. After this episode, however, exceptional even by Palestinian standards, there are a few observations that can be made, and conclusions drawn.

For one thing, post-Karine A, it is unimaginable that any Israeli government -- except a far-left one led, say, by Yossi Beilin -- would agree to grant the Palestinians a state that has exclusive control over its borders with Jordan and Egypt. It was always stupid to assume that Israel might take such a risk. It would be even more stupid to think that Israel could take such a risk from here on.

The borders will need to be under much tighter supervision than Ehud Barak had suggested at Camp David in the summer of 2000, where he proposed joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols along the border and joint supervision of the border crossings.

This essentially means that in one way or another, the future Palestinian state will remain a combination of two semi-enclaves "wrapped" by Israel, with strict control of shipping off Gaza�s coast as well.

Furthermore, contrary to Israel�s routine assessments, it turns out that Arafat has maintained intimate working relationships with Hizballah and Iran, although both those parties have publicly criticized his cease-fire moves.

Arafat has kept an open, though clandestine, channel to Iran by means of a special envoy who pays frequent visits to Teheran while successfully eluding media attention. And with Hizballah, Arafat has been able to build on old acquaintances, including Imad Mughniyeh, Hizballah�s deputy secretary general and chief of operations who appears on the United States� list of the world�s 22 most wanted terrorists.

Mughniyeh grew up in Beirut and was a young trainee in Force 17, Arafat�s own bodyguard. He and Arafat still have a common language. This PA-Hizballah-Iranian axis has even got the Egyptians publicly upset. They want Arafat as a junior ally, not as a partner in a rival pro-Iranian coalition.

The Palestinian-Iranian cooperation in the Karine A operation should not be viewed as a one-time incident but as a trend developing simultaneously and in parallel with Arafat�s maneuvers to reclaim American favor.

And those who believe these two lines of policy are contradictory should stop worrying about contradictions. This is the way Arafat likes his politics to look.

As an operation, the Palestinian/Iranian performance was not particularly impressive. The decision to load the Karine A with its deadly cargo at Kish Island off the Iranian coast was reckless, in light of the fact that the region is under very close American surveillance. Kish Island was formerly Iran�s entertainment and prostitution Mecca under the shah.

The Palestinians are also apparently unaware of how deeply their ranks are penetrated by Israeli and other intelligence services. They�ll be busy seeking out the collaborators now, but this time, too late.

On the Israeli side, the military operation was complicated because of political considerations -- especially the need not to provoke Egyptian and Saudi Arabian sensitivities deep down the Red Sea. But in itself, it was actually quite a straightforward commando performance, meeting no resistance. In general, the rule is the farther away you operate from Israel -- the boat was seized in the Red Sea 500 kilometers from Eilat -- the easier it gets. The surprise was complete. But the test here, of course, was not of the Israeli naval elites� operational capability, but rather one of intelligence.

Many senior PA politicos are now snorting and railing against Arafat, accusing him in private of wild adventurism. They can fume as much as they want, though. Arafat will have no problem convincing them, as usual, to sit in his reception room attending meetings with any passing foreign dignitaries, while in the back rooms the rais will keep wheeling and dealing with guys such as Fuad Shobaki. Shobaki, the bureaucrat in charge of bankrolling all the Palestinian security organs, acted as the chief financier of the Karine A operation, with Arafat�s full backing.

Changing the balance of forces will remain Arafat�s primary objective. Introducing long-range Katyusha rockets that can reach up to 20 kilometers seems to him the proper way to deter Israel from punitive actions after terrorist operations. Creating a threat to Israeli urban centers will remain his goal, even as he resorts again to the role of "perpetual negotiator."