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Going Nowhere
Hirsh Goodman

Assuming President Bush is serious about pushing ahead with brokering a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, how will it play out?

Presumably, the starting line for resumed negotiations will be where the sides left off � a difficult point to pin down, there being many versions of what exactly was agreed on, where and when.

Essentially, however, one can assume that on the table will be the following anticipated concessions from Israel: all of non-Jewish Jerusalem; almost all of the West Bank with, perhaps, minor border modifications; the principle of a land swap for any territory Israel does keep in the West Bank; loss of control of the Temple Mount, and some acceptable formula dealing with the refugee issue. And from the Palestinians: an unequivocal and nonretractable declaration of the �end of conflict� and agreement to a state bound from birth by serious restrictions, such as being divided in two and being demilitarized.

If Bush, closely aided by Britain�s Tony Blair, is successful in getting Arafat to agree to his end of the bargain, what would Israel�s response be? Ariel Sharon has no intention of giving up any of Jerusalem and no intention of uprooting even non-viable settlements. He will not give up parts of 1948 Israel. There is not an item on the list that Sharon can agree to, other, perhaps, than some face-saving formula on the refugee issue. To think that he will is unrealistic.

But Sharon is under huge pressure. If he completely fails to respond to the diplomatic initiative, he places in jeopardy Israel�s relations with the U.S. and Britain, countries currently short on patience and concentrating on their own war. Sharon also probably sees the Labor party walking out of the National Unity Government, seriously weakening his ability to maintain a parliamentary majority. To do so he would have to become totally dependent on Shas, the extreme right wing (assuming it returns if Labor leaves), and the ultra-Orthodox, each party being able to bring him down at the drop of a hat � not an enviable position to be in, and one certain to cause a slow and painful political death.

Sharon could call an early election. There are several advantages here. He would forestall American pressure by claiming, with some justice, that he could not bind the future prime minister with hasty, last-minute deals. And his supposed rival, the Labor Party, is in a state of total disarray, left shattered by Ehud Barak, leaderless because of internal power struggles, without an ideological base given the collapse of the Oslo Accords.

For Sharon to call an election, however, would be political suicide. Waiting in the wings is Benjamin Netanyahu, his message loud and clear: Sharon brought you neither peace nor security. The Palestinians cannot be trusted. They want it all and we have to fight them to the end. Israel has to prepare itself for a long and protracted war against Palestinian terror, and, like the rest of the democratic world, we will ultimately win.

Not only does Netanyahu have a clear message, he has the Likud in his pocket organizationally and emotionally. For Sharon to call an election now would be his adieu to politics forever, something he is not yet ready for. He is just beginning to enjoy his job.

Given the dilemmas he faces, Sharon�s strategy will probably be to play both sides of the fence � going far enough to satisfy Peres and the Labor party, but not far enough to infuriate the right. In other words, Sharon�s only strategy for coping with any American peace plan can be to aim to go nowhere � a difficult course to follow, especially when you are being propelled by events moving along at a hundred miles an hour.

One would suspect that Sharon would have the support of the majority of the Israeli public in pursuing this course. Even the left has come away from this past year battered and bruised, not sure if one can actually make a deal with Arafat, whether one can trust him. And while Netanyahu is popular in the Likud, most Israelis are looking for some modicum of stability in their lives, the type of stability afforded by a national unity government with the country in the hands of two elder statesmen, Sharon and Labor�s Shimon Peres.

And then there is yet another scenario: If Bush is serious and Arafat � whose war of liberation, as he sees it, has restored Palestinian pride to a point where he feels he is dealing with Israel as an equal � is serious, Israel will have to get serious. Though it lacks leadership and purpose, the Labor party, at some stage, would have to walk and an election would become inevitable. Because the Labor Party cannot agree on who should lead it at present, the issue being before the party�s courts, its forums could decide to ask Peres to take them into that election. Reluctantly, of course, Peres would accept and go against Netanyahu head-on, offering a vision for a better future with a reborn Arafat, as opposed to Netanyahu�s 500-year war.

Who knows, he could actually win. Despite being battered and bruised, the polls show consistently that most Israelis would prefer to take a chance on peace than opt for perennial war. In 1996 Netanyahu defeated Peres mainly because of Arafat�s spate of bus bombs in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This time the outcome, if an election comes about, would very much be in Arafat�s hands again. What a depressing thought.