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Beware the Generals
Hirsh Goodman

This is not the time to let Shaul Mofaz run foreign policy

We in israel are so busy fighting the Palestinians these past few months that we are failing to see dangers back home. The recent development most threatening to the basic fabric of Israeli democracy is the military's decision to dictate policy, not execute it.

Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz caused a stir when he issued an official statement through the army spokesman that he was opposed to the Israeli army withdrawing from two positions in Hebron. The statement was, in essence, direct criticism of a decision taken by the security cabinet on the advice of the defense minister, who was relying on expert military opinion given to him by the deputy chief of staff in advance of the cabinet meeting. Mofaz, ever the artful politician, had found a diplomatic reason for not being able to brief the defense minister himself, sending his deputy instead. Why be associated with any compromise on Hebron when you intend to enter politics on a right-wing ticket the day after shedding your uniform? Mofaz was subsequently formally reprimanded for the statement by the defense minister, and he issued another statement of clarification and apology.

More serious, however, was an incident in the last week of October when the head of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Amos Malka, called a press conference to warn that if the government decided that afternoon to withdraw Israeli forces from any of the six West Bank towns invaded in the aftermath of the assassination of tourism minister Rechavam Zeevy, terrorism would rise, as would Israeli casualties. The head of military intelligence is supposed to make this type of assessment to his boss, the chief of staff; the government, to whom he is formally obligated to provide the national intelligence assessment; and the minister of defense, whom he is supposed to serve. It is unheard of for the head of military intelligence to take to the microphones just hours in advance of a security cabinet session on the subject in order to preempt the result.

The army wanted to stay where it deployed in the wake of the October 17 assassination of Rechavam Zeevy � in Area A, the areas handed over to full Palestinian control under the terms of the Oslo Accords. The military was never happy with Israel�s security being in the hands of the Palestinians. Being back in Area A remedies the situation to a certain degree from the army�s point of view.

What Malka did was to go on national radio and television to warn the security cabinet of the government of Israel that if it decided to withdraw there would be blood on its hands. He was also covering the military�s backside should the security situation deteriorate � both absolutely inexcusable acts for a soldier serving in a democracy. It is the military�s duty to assess the threat, inform the decision-making echelons, propose alternate solutions and lay out the consequences of each of these. It is the cabinet of Israel, representing the elected Knesset and the people, that makes the decisions. Soldiers take soldiers� considerations into account. The cabinet�s task is to consider the broader implications of any action, such as the impact on Israel�s relations with the U.S., for example, and then decide what to do. The army�s job is to do it.

This war Israel is fighting with the Palestinians is no longer a local, or even a regional, issue. The events of September 11 ended that. Any moves Israel makes at this time have to be placed against the yardstick of American interests when its war against terror is, more and more, at risk of being perceived as a war against Islam by the Arab and Muslim world. A reinvasion of Palestine by Israeli forces, even if it enables Mofaz to prevent two Palestinian attacks within Israel next week, is not something the U.S. needs right now. This is not about two tanks in Abu Sneinah in Hebron. It�s about whose hands Pakistan�s nuclear arsenal could fall into. America has always been fully supportive of Israel as long as its own core interests were not threatened. Never have they been more threatened than they are now. This is not the time to let Mofaz run foreign policy.

What Mofaz and even some of our own ministers seem to have forgotten is the old truth that the Israel-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved by military means. It can be contained by military means, but not won. In the end, when the sides are exhausted and there is nothing left to gain from conflict, when the cemeteries are full of more fresh graves of the young and wasted, diplomacy will prevail. One can accept that the national unity government we now have in place will have to redefine itself when diplomacy is a real option. Until then the prime minister has two primary tasks: contain the Palestinians and limit the damage on that front, and contain the generals before a de facto putsch takes place.