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Unhappy Anniversary
Ehud Ya'ari

Almost all the members of the Palestinian leadership, politicians and military commanders alike, have reached the same conclusion:

The intifada is not going the way they want it to. How do we know? Easy. They themselves make a point of telling this to as many Israeli, American and especially European counterparts as they can.

Of course, when they go on air on any one of the Arabic satellite stations, they sound as fervent and adamant as ever, swearing that the intifada will continue to grow from strength to strength until it achieves "the end of the occupation." The gap between what is served up on TV for popular consumption and the other reality in closed meeting rooms yawns ever wider.

Foreign diplomats are repeatedly taken aback by the harsh and brazen opinions that senior Palestinian Authority figures express in private about Yasser Arafat. Mentioning any names would only get them into trouble. But those Israeli activists on the left who are trying to bodily bust a way through to the other side for Shimon Peres have also been struck lately by the levels of bitterness that have built up among their Palestinian colleagues over the intifada's lack of tangible results, on the eve of its first anniversary.

And Arafat, so far, remains Arafat. The Jews, he tells his entourage, will yet make the fatal mistake; all that is required is patience. A bomb that misses its target and hits a concentration of people, or some other operational hitch � something will happen to turn the tables, he assures them, and what now looks like an unprofitable investment will yet be converted into a successful gambit.

The PA chairman is not in the mood for a change of course. Anyone he considers to have gone soft pays for it. Abu Mazen, for example, has been shut out of the halls of power for months, ever since he voiced criticism of Arafat during a visit to Washington. Fatah leaflets distributed in Ramallah rail against West Bank Preventive Security head Col. Jibril Rajoub. He is widely suspected of being vehemently opposed to the "askara," or militarization, of what was supposed to have been a popular uprising. Gaza Preventive Security chief Muhammad Dahlan has been falling in and out of favor as well. Hakam Bala'awi, long ignored by Arafat, has now been brought back to head Fatah's organization in the West Bank.

While the general public only ever gets a few hints of it, the broad brushstrokes of the internal debate within the Palestinian leadership are reasonably clear: On one side sit the Tanzim heads like Marwan al-Barghouti; several of the PLO veterans who came from Tunis, such as Sakher Habash, Hani al-Hassan and others; and a few commanders of the PA security branches including some officers of Force 17, Arafat's presidential guard, and the head of military intelligence, Col. Musa Arafat. They argue that the chairman should "come out of the closet" and openly place himself at the head of a new "front" that vigorously declares its determination to fight the occupation to the end. That is, to involve the PA's regular forces in the intifada and to stop pretending that the campaign of violence isn't being directly run by Arafat. Moreover, they are demanding "internal reform" � code for a massive purge of the PA, a strengthening of the partnership with Hamas on the basis of a political program "outside of Oslo" and an escalation in violence, from dozens to hundreds of incidents a day. They argue that a switch is needed from "negative mode" � offering Palestinian casualties, to a "positive mode" � killing more Israelis.

The other side believes that such a course will only increase the losses of the intifada; deepen the estrangement of the United States and a growing number of European countries from Arafat; and open the way for the Israeli army to take ever-stronger action. They point out that the world has already effectively reconciled itself to Israel's "targeted killings" from helicopters and incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas. The closure of Orient House dropped quickly from the agenda.

In their view, the Palestinian attrition is faster-paced than that on the Israeli side. One of the symptoms is the migration to Jordan, mainly of mothers and children while the father of the family stays behind. Their suggestion is to cut their losses, cancel the armed character of the intifada and examine options for an exit strategy.

The debate is ongoing and has not reached any conclusion, primarily because the exit-seekers are simply too afraid to voice their opinions out loud. In the best case, they hide anonymously behind unsigned articles such as the recent one written by "the political editor of WAFA," the official Palestinian news agency.

Furthermore, fierce internal rivalries prevent them from being able to organize into a single pressure group that could influence Arafat enough to listen to their counsel. Only rarely does one of them dare to talk to Arafat about the danger involved in letting things deteriorate further.

Otherwise, flattery rules. Nowadays, nobody dares voice reservations out loud about suicide bombings. And bad-mouthing Shimon Peres to the point of outright insult has become part of the rhetorical norm.

So the internal unity on the other side of the divide is on the wane. Domestic tensions are close to sliding into open confrontation, and the sense of frustration is building up. Anyone who sits down opposite the Palestinians for negotiations ought to bear this in mind all along the way. (September 24, 2001)